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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 1 begins with the preview of the Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG)
and its long-term leases of the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) and the Chicago Skyway. I
discuss the methodology employed to value the toll roads in the actual Macquarie
Analyst's Package (2006). The chapter presents detailed past and present financial
performance of the ITR. It investigates why the State of Indiana decided to go for the
long-term lease even when the toll road operations were not experiencing any serious
financial setback.
Chapter 2 explains various methods that I employed to value the ITR, including
adjusted present value (APV) and Monte Carlo Simulation.
Chapter 3 evaluates the Chicago Skyway's financial performance. Chapter 4
values the Chicago Skyway by employing the same methods as for the ITR.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with a brief summary of the main issues
addressed in the preceding chapters. It also discusses larger implications and
consequences of correct valuation of such infrastructure assets.
1.2 Thesis Methodology
The research methodology to gather data for this thesis consisted of detailed
review of actual Macquarie Model, personal interviews and a literature review of cost of
capital and valuation. The other sources included scholarly articles, professional reports,
government documents (testimony), and websites. The interviews engaged the State of
Indiana officials and attendees at the International Transport Economics Conference
held in Minnesota (June, 2009). I used Crystal Ball to calculate the Monte Carlo
Simulation.
1.3 Thesis Research Question
In light of the aging infrastructure and budget constraints, several US state
governments appear to follow the trend of opting for long-term leases of public
infrastructure assets. According to the 2006 study published by the Reason Foundation,
there are about $25 billion in projects that have been proposed or are in development
(Robert Poole, 2006). A careful examination of the financial analysis of such deals has
important implications for public policy decisions. By carrying out such critical
evaluation of the earlier studies for the ITR and Chicago Skyway, I will add to existing
literature on privatizing toll roads.
Figure 1: Contracting out of toll roads
LOCAT)ON ROUTE PROJECT ESTIMATED COST, N BILLIONS
San Antonio to Dallas TTC-35 Build toll road $7,2
Virginia 1-81 RebuiWl, add toll-truc lanes 7 0
Dallas 1-635 Re buk, add HOT [lines 3 ,0
Atanta 1-75/575 Add HOT and toll-trick lanes 1 .8
Portland, Ore. 3 noe' routes Build toll roas 1
Nortlhm irgina 1-495 Add HOT ..
San Diego SR 125 Build tolt roxi Ido,6
San A ornio Loop 1604 Add OT l ies if C6
Fort Worth SH-161 Build toll road 1 5
iDenvr C-4 70 Add HOT lanes 30,.4
Source: Reason Foundation, 2006
- -=- - I-- I I - -~--~ -C- ---
In this chapter, I firstly aim to answer the questions that were raised during June
2009 when I presented this paper during the International Transport Economics
Conference in Minnesota.
Small (20091) argued that the thesis could benefit from a closer connection
between the financial analysis and economic concepts like opportunity cost, in order to
better understand what Indiana or Chicago is really giving up to monetize the future
revenue streams. He further questioned that is ra meant to describe this particular asset,
or a market rate on "all securities"? I explained that I take into account the opportunity
cost of capital or cost of capital while calculating the net present value of the toll road
under various scenarios. As Kolbe (2004) in his testimony explains it clearly that the
cost of capital is the expected rate of return in capital markets on alternative investments
of equivalent risk. He further explains that "By the cost of capital, I mean the bare
minimum rate of return necessary to attract the capital and to compensate the investors
for a given level of risk, since that is what they could earn elsewhere without bearing
any more risk" hence I do take into account the concept of opportunity cost of capital.
In other words, it is the competitive market price for capital exposed to a given level of
risk. To treat both investors and customers fairly, regulatory procedures should operate
so that the company expects to earn the cost of capital on the assets its investors' money
has bought.
Small (2009, p.5) argues that depreciation constituted a major deduction in the
ITR and Chicago Skyway however, based on the Macquarie model, it does not appear
for ITR. Small (2009, p.6) also defines the risk premium the way MIG does in the
Valuation Policy 2006, according to his definition, the risk-premium varies with the
stages of development of the toll road however for calculations; we need to use the
market risk premium to calculate the risk premium. He further questioned whether there
are limits on amount of federal tax-exempt bond financing available? No, there is as
1 He was one of the attendees in the International Transport Economics Conference held on June, 15-16,
2009 in Minnesota.
such no limit on amount of federal tax-exempt bond financing available. However the
State of Indiana remains careful about the effects of such debt issue on its credit rating.
When I started writing this thesis, I read all the MIG's presentation reports and it
claimed that for the ITR and Chicago Skyway, the toll elasticity of demand is low.
However after one year, I have doubts about this given assumption. Matas and Raymond
(2003) find that the elasticity of demand varies for various sections of a same motorway
and may be related to the quality of the alternative road.
Brown (2007), head of public finance for the West Region at Goldman, Sachs &
Co hinted at the trend that the market for such PPPs was being fueled by the enormous
amounts of cash that pension funds needed to invest in predictable, long-term cash
flows. An interesting future question is how the role of institutions would evolve in this
respect. For electricity provision, Henisz and Zelner (2002) tried to answer this question
by comparing four countries including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. All these four countries undertook privatization roughly at the same time and
these countries experienced the same shock in the form of the 1997 East Asian
Financial crisis. Based on the results, the investors in Thailand and the Philippines fared
considerably well following the crisis than did investors in Malaysia and Indonesia. The
source of difference was that the investors in Thailand and the Philippines relied more
heavily on contractual safeguards.
CHAPTER 2
IMPETUS FOR THE RECENT RESTRUCTURING FOR THE
MACQUARIE MODEL
Barry (2009) argues with hindsight that the State of Indiana got the better
financial deal, since the Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) is currently losing
money on four of its six North American toll roads, including the ITR and the Chicago
Skyway. The MIG is experiencing declining traffic volumes and high interest expenses.
Barry (2009) draws such conclusion on basis of incomplete information, however. The
MIG usually finances the long-term leases at very high debt ratios. The MIG pays off
the debt within eight or nine years after each transaction, so one cannot judge the
performance of MIG on basis of current high interest expenses.
In August 2009, the MIG did announce plans for a financial restructuring,
however. The original "Macquarie Model" constituted of two trusts and one company
(see Appendix 1 at the end of the chapter). In 2009, the proposed restructuring called for
split into two listed entities. According to Mcdonald and Sechler (2009), the split would
be made on the basis of risk-return profiles of the toll roads.
Why did the MIG decide for the restructuring in 2009? Why do many investors
and journalists come up with different conclusions about the same MIG model? In
recent past, the MIG has gained considerable attention because of outbidding all other
major investment banks for two public assets: the ITR (2006) and the Chicago Skyway
(2005).
So far the debate has been mainly descriptive, centered on public finance and
auction designs. I wanted to look at the deals from financial aspect.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: in light of relevant and recent
literature, Section 1 describes the pros and cons of such lease agreements in the US.
Section II discusses whether the ITR was experiencing some serious financial setback. It
also gives details about the Major Moves Initiative, Indiana Governor Daniel's
ambitious plan that prompted the State of Indiana to look for sources for large, one-time
cash injection. Section III gives detail about the ITR's performance in the post-lease
period. Section IV critically evaluates some of the oft-cited earlier analyses of the ITR's
valuation. Section V gives details about the organization structure and history of MIG
and it highlights key restructuring steps that the MIG management has taken since 2000.
By giving such details, it aims to answer the question how the valuation of these two
deals (mainly the ITR) would have been impacted if the private investor had not been
the MIG. The section also gives a summary of key developments such as a series of
acquisitions and the Group's non-recourse loans in 2006. It also gives summary of the
Analyst's Model used by MIG to arrive at the asset's value and bid price. In light of
above discussion, Section VI concludes the chapter and highlights the larger
implications and consequences of correctly valuing such infrastructure assets.
2.1. Section I: For and against the long-term lease agreements
The trend of selling infrastructure assets on long-term leases is gaining attention
in the US. In my thesis, I am focusing on privatization of transportation assets such as
toll roads. The concept of privatization denotes the transfer of traditionally public
services such as toll roads to the private operator (Baxandall, 2009). Buxbaum et el.
(2007) define the public private partnerships (PPPs) as any contractual agreement
between the public sector and a private entity that allows for private sector participation
in the delivery of transportation projects. The recent transactions include the Indiana
Toll Road (ITR) (June 2006) and the Chicago Skyway (July 2005). When we discuss
the financial aspects of such deals, the debate mainly centers on two questions:
a) Did the bidder pay the right price for the toll road?
b) And given that the toll road is a public good, is public interest compromised
in such deals?
One motive behind such long-term lease agreements is that the PPPs result in
increased efficiency. Geltner and Moavenzadeh (1987) and Bauxam et al. (2007) discuss
potential economic justifications for privatizing highways. These include
a) Greater revenues in the form of tolls so that the states do not have to raise taxes
b) Increased efficiency associated with lower maintenance costs.
The supporters of such agreements argue that the multi-billion-dollar
transactions are sources of revenues for the state governments. One economic argument
for such deals is that toll roads under public entity ownership may not be generating
sufficient operating surpluses (revenues minus operating expenditures). Supporters of
the PPPs regard it as an example of progressive thinking on the part of the state to find
additional sources to improve the toll road without raising gas taxes. Meckler (2006)
said that according to the study published by the Fitch Ratings, a credit-rating company,
concluded that "toll roads are good candidates for privatization" but cautioned that
adding a profit incentive to the toll operations could lead to tolls that are so high that
they may lead to traffic diversion.
The opponents of the PPPs insist on approaching the idea of private toll roads
with caution, as they argue that the short-term benefits are likely to outweigh the long-
term costs. They insist that by privatizing highways, the officials hand over significant
control over to private operators who are accountable to their shareholders, not the
public.
Such discussion is incomplete. The opponents of such arrangements do not
analyze the complete financial picture of the state governments. The state governments
have budget constraints and limited sources of revenues. Such sources of revenues
include direct charges such as tolls, and indirect charges and taxes. However the policy
actions related to such measures entail important political implications. Some empirical
evidence exists that the toll elasticity of demand is low for roads such as the ITR
(Macquarie ITR presentation, 2008) but still the state governments appear averse to toll
increases.
In an article on privatizing toll roads, Baxandall (2008) discusses the
disadvantages of such deals. He questions the assumption under such concession
agreements that the private operator can bring additional efficiency gains. He further
argues whether the private operator will still go for such deals if the concession term is
shorter than 75 or 99 years. The Chicago Skyway concession stretches 99 years; the ITR
concession deal lasts for 75 years. He opposes such arrangements. According to him, if
such deal is not performing well, the public cannot hold anyone accountable. He
mentions the non-compete clause in the ITR concession agreement, which prevents
Indiana from building a four-lane, divided highway more than 20 miles long or
expanding a current highway to Interstate standards within 10 miles of the East-West
Toll Road for at least 55 years without providing compensation to the toll road operator
for the lost revenue.
The PPP deals entail high transaction costs and monitoring and legal costs for
the state governments. Goldman Sachs was paid $20 million for financial advice on the
Indiana privatization deal and $9 million for the Chicago Skyway (Statewide Mobility
Partners LLC and Subsidiary financial statements, 2006). The opponents also mention
that the decision-makers might use the money to provide short-term budget relief for
programs not related to transportation, as was done in the Chicago Skyway lease.
In an article on deficit in federal highway funds, Kelderman (2007) argues that
for states increasing tolls is not the only solution to solve the problem of lack of funds.
He proposes that the state governments need to look for other sources of revenues such
as raising the federal gas tax, an indirect charge that was raised 14 years ago. He
questions whether the private operator provides services more competitively than the
public entity. See also Geltner and Moavenzadeh (1987).
From the above debate, it is hard to conclude whether it is beneficial for the
states to undertake these agreements. The main question emerges whether the state
governments go for such deals because the PPPs offer additional efficiency in the form
of higher.toll revenues or reduced operating expenditures? Or is their sole motive for
such transaction a one-time quick cash injection? Do the state governments weigh the
short-term versus long-term implications associated with such deals?
2.2. Section II: Long-term lease of the Indiana toll road (ITR)
In my thesis, I will be focusing on the financial aspect of such transactions.
Based on the financial data collected, I will look at two cases; the Indiana toll road
(ITR) and the Chicago Skyway. This chapter will contribute to the existing literature by
adopting such methodology:
a) What was the financial performance of the ITR before the long-term
lease? More importantly, which measures did the Indiana Finance
Authority (IFA) employ to measure the toll road performance? Was the
asset really underperforming? If not, then why did the IFA still privatize
the asset?
b) What did Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) assume about the cost
of capital for valuing the ITR? Partially, the answer to such question
depends on the availability of the Macquarie financial model used to
calculate the bid price of toll road. (I will address this question in detail
in the next chapter when I describe the Macquarie Financial Model in
detail).
c) What did the earlier published studies assume about the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) of the concessionaire? Did they make
the correct assumptions?
2.3. Description of the asset
The ITR, established in 1956, is 157 miles (252.7 kilometers) in length. The road
spans northern Indiana, from its border with Ohio to the Illinois state line near Chicago,
feeding directly into two toll roads at the state lines - the Chicago Skyway in the west
and the Ohio Turnpike in the east.
Functioning as the primary connection between the Chicago skyway and
Indiana's Ohio Border, the toll road has been referred to as the "Main Street of the
Midwest". The road was opened to traffic in 1956. The ITR operates an electronic toll
collection (ETC) and cash closed barrier tolling system on the western end and an ETC
and cash ticket system on the eastern end. The IFA did not change the toll rates since
1985. The ITR has two toll collection systems, a barrier system and a ticket system.
The Barrier system is used in the first 23 miles of the western portion of the
road. Under the barrier system, the customers pay their tolls at time of entry to the toll
road, as well as at certain exit points within this portion. The ticket system is used from
mile post 24 to the eastern end of the road. Under the ticket system, the customers obtain
a ticket as they enter this section of the toll road and pay for the toll based on the rates
stated on the ticket when they exit this section. Toll revenues are collected in four ways;
cash collections, electronic toll collection (ETC), commercial charge account, and IFA
reimbursement.
Figure 2: ITR Road Configuration
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There is commuter based traffic on the ITR barrier system. Electronic toll
collection (ETC) was introduced to the barrier system in June 2007. It currently
accounts for approximately 40 percent of transactions on the barrier system. The key
features of traffic on barrier system are
a) Noticeable AM and PM peaks
b) Seasonality slightly skewed to stronger traffic months of June to
September
c) Low demand elasticity (The MIG does not give detail how they have
calculated the elasticity).
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Figure 3: Barrier System (ITR)
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Source: The MIG presentation to the investors regarding the ITR, (2006, p.7)
The ticket system is characterized by freight based traffic. The key features of
the traffic on such system are
a) Commercial traffic profile with no discernible daily peaks
b) Low elasticity of demand of truck traffic was observed on the adjoining Ohio
Turnpike from price increases over the 1994-1999 periods
c) Tolls increased by 82percent over the period with an average growth in traffic of
1.8percent per year compared to 3.0percent per year since opening.
d) The estimated commercial vehicle toll elasticity is approximately -0.04 (MIG
Presentation ITR, 2008). Again, MIG does not give any detail about how it
calculated the toll elasticity demand.
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Figure 4: ITR Ticket System
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2.4. Financial condition of the ITR up to 2006
The condition of the toll road is a primary factor in determining the financial
health of the toll road (ITR balance sheet, 2002). To keep the toll road in good
condition, the toll road management has to regularly make repair and renovation
outlays. Before June 2006, the ITR management used such expense as a measure to
determine the financial health of the toll road. It also used various other measures to
measure the toll road performance. These measures included the ITR's toll revenues and
the traffic volume.
The section below describes the key statistics about the vehicle traffic revenues,
revenue growth (in percentage) etc.
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2.4.1. Key ITR statistics before the MIG Lease
The vehicle traffic is comprised of two categories: passenger and commercial
traffic. Based on the five-year period, overall the vehicle traffic (in million) is
experiencing an increase. Based on the vehicle traffic volume, the percentage passenger
traffic is almost the same. Based on table 1, the commercial traffic is going up.
Table 1: Key ITR's Traffic Statistics (2001-2005)
Vehicle Traffic - In millions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Passenger 43 46 45 45 45
Commercial 9 9 9 9 1 0
Total Traffic 52 - 55 - 53 54 6 55
Veviene Traffic -Percenta e growth(IV c millio)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Passenger 6% -3% 1% 0%
Commercial I -1% -6% 6% 8%
Total Traffic
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average passenger revenue 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.77
per trip
Average commercial 5.4 5.28 5.54 5.48 5.48
revenue per trip
Average revenue per trip 1.561.61 1.57 1.54 1.49 1.56based on vehicle mix
Source: Financial statements, the Indiana toll road, 2001-2005
As shown in above table, there is a large difference in the revenue per
vehicle trip for the two categories of traffic. Financially it would make more
sense for the ITR management to have a healthy mix of passenger and
commercial vehicle traffic. Based on 2004 ITR's revenues, the ticket system
constitutes 82 percent of toll revenues. Within that category, the commercial
traffic subcategory comprises of major percentage.
_ ~~~ ~ ~- -- _ ---- -- ~-- - -------- _ _ _--~--~ aT L-- -C ~
Table 2: Ticket and Barrier Systems Toll Revenues 2004
In $ million
Barrier System -ITR Ticket System -ITR
18 percent of toll revenue 82 percent of toll revenue
Commercial 4.4 Commercial 45.2
Passenger 10.7 Passenger 24.7
15.1 69.9
Source: The ITR's presentation to the investors, 2008
Table 3: Toll Revenues (in $ million)
Toll Revenues (in millions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Passenger vehicle 32 35 35 35 35
Commercial vehicle 49 48 47 49 53
Total toll revenue 1 82 83 82 84 88
Toll Revenue Gtowth(%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Passenger vehicl e  1 % 8% 0% 1% -1%
Commercial vehicle -6% -3% -1% 5% 8%
Average revenue growth
based on vehicle mix 3% 1% -1% 3% 4%
Source: Financial statements, the Indiana toll road, 2001-2005
The sluggish economy appears to be reflected in the toll road project's drop in
commercial toll revenue in 2002. Substitution of car trips for airline trips may be the
cause of that increase in passenger car revenues. In addition to the overall national
economy, the, toll road project provides a transportation corridor for two major
industries, the steel industry in Northwest Indiana and the recreational vehicle industry
in North Central Indiana. As those industries expand or contract, toll road project
revenue is affected accordingly.
Most of the toll road operations use EBITDA as an indicator of the toll road
operations. If we use such indicator as a measure of the ITR's profitability then the ITR
still remains as a profitable operation.
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The ITR's EBITDA upto 2006
EBITDA 21 22 32 24 31
EBITDA
(Margin 24 23 34 25 31
percent)
Source: ITR's P&L statements 2002-2006
According to Crowe Chizek (2005), the ratings of the toll road's highways and
bridges were as follows:
Percentage in Good or Better Condition
I 2003 2004 2005
Interstate Roads 92% 96% 91%
Interstate Bridges 100% 100% 100%
Source: Crowe Chizek (2005)
In both 2002 and 2003, 100 percent of the toll road projects were rated in good
or better condition. In both years, 100 percent of the Toll Road Project's bridges were
rated in good or better condition. The question remains why the ITR management did
not consider it as indicator of good performance of a toll road?
Based on the above statistics, it appears that the toll road operations were not
experiencing any major financial decline at the time till 2005 when the IFA decided to
pursue the concession agreement. However, the IFA claimed that the financial
performance of the toll road had fallen short of the level in which it was expected to
perform. The Indiana department of Transportation (INDOT) claimed that "While the
financial performance of the ITR was less than desirable, it was clearly recognized that
this asset could perform better" (ITR financial statements, p.104, 2006). The table
below shows the toll comparison chart. Based on the 2005 statistics, the ITR passenger
and commercial vehicle traffic tolls were lower as compared to other places.
Figure 5: Passenger Vehicle Toll Comparison Chart
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Figure 6: Commercial Vehicle toll comparison chart
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Source: The ITR's presentation to the investors, 2006
Why is it important to establish that the ITR was not facing any serious
financial setback? It is because some of the oft-quoted studies justify the sale of
the toll roads on financial grounds. Such studies claim that the ITR management
sold the toll road because it did not have sufficient funds to keep up the financial
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health of the toll road. Hence it is equally important part of the analysis to
investigate why the ITR was out for bid.
Table 5 exhibits detailed historical revenue figures broken down by vehicle type
for the toll road. As shown in table below, the toll revenues increased from $38
million in 1984 to almost $85 million in 2004. Toll revenues compounded
annual growth rates over the period 1984-2004 and 1994-2004 were 4.1 and 2.7
percent respectively.
Table 4: Historical Toll Revenue by Vehicle Type (1984-2004)
($ Thousands)
1984 14687 - 23473 - 38160
1985 14703 0.1 23287 -0.8 37989 -0.4
1986 15935 8.4 28014 20.3 43949 15.7
1987 18208 14.3 30468 8.8 48675 10.8
1988 19399 6.5 32467 6.6 51866 6.6
1989 20703 6.7 33299 2.6 54002 4.1
1990 21762 5.1 33403 0.3 55173 2.2
1991 22764 4.6 32686 -2.1 55448 0.5
1992 23735 4.3 34382 5.2 58228 5.0
1993 24509 3.3 36785 7.0 61295 5.3
1994 25267 3.1 39469 7.3 64735 5.6
1995 26149 3.5 42998 8.9 69148 6.8
1996 27396 4.8 43166 0.4 70562 2.0
1997 29559 7.9 44780 3.7 74354 5.4
1998 31666 7.1 46695 4.3 78361 5.4
1999 32422 2.4 48892 4.7 81314 3.8
2000 32405 -0.1 52071 6.5 84476 3.9
2001 32651 0.8 49190 -5.5 81841 -3.1
2002 34881 6.8 47531 -3.4 82412 0.7
2003 34882 0.0 47164 -0.8 82046 -0.4
2004 35313 1.2 49593 5.2 84907 3.5
1984-2004 4.5 3.8 4.1
1994-2004 3.4 2.3 2.7
1999-2004 1.7 0.3 0.9
1984-2000 5.1 5.1 5.1
1990-2000 4.1 4.5 4.4
Source: Request for Toll Road Concessionaire Proposals, the ITR, September 28, 2005
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As shown from above table, the toll revenues increased from $38 million in 1984
to almost $85 million in 2004. Toll revenue compounded annual growth rates over the
period 1984-2004 were 4.1 percent. Excluding the years 2001 to 2004, when
construction on 1-65 and the Chicago Skyway contributed to traffic declines, toll
revenue has been steadily growing.
2.5. Financial accounting before the MIG lease
The ITR's annual financial statements use Government Auditing Standards
(GAS). The statements include; Statement of Net Assets (in a private corporation, such
statement will be called a balance sheet (BS), which gives snapshot of the financial
picture of a company at any given time), Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and
Changes in Net Assets (in a private corporation, such statement will be called the profit
and loss (P&L) statement) and the Statement of cash flows.
2.5.1. Statement of Net Assets
According to the Government's accounting standards, such statement represents
the financial position of the toll road. It gives us an idea about the resources available to
the Toll Road Project.
$ Million
Figure 7: Statement of Net Assets
Assets 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cu rre nt Assets
Cash and cash equivalents 60 38 34 37
Investments 35 65 73 73
Accounts Receivable 4 4 4
Inventories 2 2 1
Prepaid Expenses 1 1 1
Total Current Assets 95 110 115 117
Nonctuureint Assets
Restricted cash and investment 111 92 79 60
Property, Building, and equipment 239 242 259 280
Bond Issuance costs, net 9 2 1 1
Total noncurrent assets 358 335 339 341
Total assets 453 445 455 457
LIABILITIES AND NET ASSETS
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable 8 7 7 7
Accrued salaries and related expenses 2 3 2
Liabilities payable from restricted assets 5
Accrued interest payable 5 4 7
Current portion of revenue bonds payable 12 13 14
Total Current Liabilities . 0 17 17 20
Long term portion of revenue bonds payable 228 206 196 185
Assets held on behalf of ITFA:
Invested in capital assets, net of related debt 11 25 52 82
Restricted for future debt service 192 50 51 53
Restricted for transportation improvement 9 9 9
Restricted for construction 118 104 81
Unrestricted 9 10 15 17
Total Liabilities 212 213 231 243
Accumulated other comprehensive loss
Total Liabilities and net assets 453 445 454 457
Source: ITR financial statements, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005.
2.5.2. Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and Changes in Net Assets
This statement reflects what revenues were generated and what expenses were
incurred to generate those revenues. The excess of revenues over expenses, formerly
known as the net income is reflected as a transfer to assets held on behalf of ITFA.
According to the management discussion and analysis for the June 30, 2003, the change
in the assets held on behalf of ITFA is an indicator of whether the Toll Road Project's
financial health is improving or deteriorating (ITR financial statements, p. 2, 2006).
- I I - I-- L3 Icl----i, c- P
$ Millions
Figure 8: P&L ITR - Before Privatization
Operating Revenues
Tolls 82 88 85 88 92
Concession Revenues and
other revenues 7 7 8 8 8
Total operating revenues 89 95 93 96 100
Opetating Expenses
General Administration 29 2 2 3 3
Toll collection 9 10 25 26
Road operations 9 8
Miscellaneous services 12 12 7 7
Major expense repairs and
renovation 36 39 25 33 29
Depreciation expense 3 3 3 4 3
Total operating expenses 68 73 60 72 69
Operating income 21 22 32 24 31
Non-operating revenues
(expenses)
Interest and bond amortization
expense -17 -16 -15 -15 -14
Investment revenue 5 3 1 3 6
Transportation grants -1 -2 -11
Change in net assets before
transfer of assets held on behal
of ITFA 8 7 18 12 11
Transfers to assets held on
behalf of ITFA-Net Loss -8 -7 -18 -12 -11
Source: Profit and loss statements the ITR, dated 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
The above table includes information about 2006, since the ITR was privatized
in June, 2006. The above financial summary of the ITR shows that tolls form the largest
source of revenue. Other revenues include concession revenues arising from lease
contracts and investment income earnings. Total operating expenses include costs to
repair and renovate aging infrastructure and general administration expenses. Non-
operating expenses mainly consist of interest expenses.
The operating income is measured through EBITA (earnings before interest, tax,
and amortization). A major part of the toll road's financial analysis judges the
profitability of the toll road operations by measuring EBITA or earnings before interest,
depreciation, tax or amortization (EBITDA). For the ITR, the Indiana management
measured it through calculating EBITA. As shown in table above, in 2006, the $11.7
million revenue surplus was possibly large because the state had earlier decided to delay
capital improvement projects. Moreover, none of the ITR's surpluses were used to fund
other state programs or capital projects (Johnson et al., 2007). During 2005 and 2006,
the grant fund distributions from the restricted transportation improvement funds and
unrestricted resources totaled $11.4 million.
2.5.3. Statement of Cash Flow
Such statement reflects the cash provided to the toll road project from its
activities; operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities. The cash and
cash equivalents category at the end of the year represents the ability of the toll road
district to weather difficult economic times and to fund needed projects in future years.
The ITR's management breaks cash and cash equivalents into restricted and
unrestricted cash. The restricted cash category comprises of two items; cash and short-
term investments. Such items are set aside for future capital projects, transportation
grants or bond payments. The unrestricted cash categories include the cash and short-
term investments. Such funds cover emergencies and the operating cash requirements.
The largest segment of the capital assets is infrastructure. According to the
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the toll district no longer capitalizes
expenditures that are made to infrastructure renovations. The increase in concession
revenue can be because of many reasons: the increase because of the completion of
renovations of fuel facilities at two travel plaza pairs. The operating expenses included
insurance cost increases included fringe benefits and general administration expense.
($ million)
Figure 9: Cash Flow Statements - Pre ITR Privatization
Cash inflows (outflowsi froni
operating activities
Tolls 84 82 85 88 10
Concessionaires 7 6 8 7
(Payroll and Benefits) -21 -20 -23 -25 -28
(Contractors and suppliers) -43 -48 -34 -42 -42
Net cash from operating activities 27 20 36 28 29
Cash Flows from investing
activities
Net Purchases of investments 80 -30 -8 0 73
Investment income 5 3 1 3 6
Net cash outflow from investing
activities 85 -28 -7 3 79
Cash flows from capital and
financing activities
CAPEX (Capital expenditues) -1 -6 -21 -24 -6
Principal payment on revenue bonds -9 -12 -12 -13 -14
Interest paid on revenue bonds -15 -14 -13 -10 -14
Transportation grants paid 0 -2 -11
Net cash from capital and financing
activities -25 -33 -46 -47 -45
Transfer of cash to the Indiana
Finance Authority -155
Net change in cash and cash
equivalents 86 -41 -17 -16 -91
Source: Cash flow statements, the ITR dated 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
The EBITDA is calculated by subtracting operating expenses from total
operating revenues. The EBITDA margin, expressed as a percentage is a ratio of
operating income and total revenues. For ITR's analysis, the EBITDA has not
experienced major changes and has remained stable. Such operating surplus is
eventually used for capital improvements, to pay off outstanding debt, or to offset other
costs or cross-subsidize other expenditures.
On October 19, 2006, in a presentation "Infrastructure Privatization: The Indiana
Toll Road", Charles E. Schalliol, the director of the Indiana office of Management and
Budget revealed that the state budget was in the deficit. He further disclosed that given
the highway funding gap exceeded $2 billion, the IFA lacked funds to invest in the
capital improvement projects. The details of the $2 billion deficit are given in the
section below.
2.5.4. Major Moves Initiative Program
The Major Moves Program is a transportation program that is unique to Indiana.
It is unique in that it is a fully funded ten-year program (2006 to 2015) for
transportation, expansion and preservation projects throughout the State of Indiana. The
Major Moves initiative is made up of two categories of work which are significant to the
long-term plan. These two categories include the New Construction and Major
Preservation programs. The New Construction program is a project specific, ten-year
program that focuses on added capacity programs, new roadways, added travel lanes
and bridges. The Major Preservation program, a project specific ten-year plan focuses
on reconstruction and major road rehabilitation projects.
Figure 10: May 2005 Project Funding Analysis Identifying Transportation Funding
Gap
2006 2007 20 20 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Annual Funding Gap -40 -169 -152 -131 -168 -207 -250 -297 -349 -405
Cumulative Gap -40 -209 -361 -492 -660 -867 -1117 -1414 -1763 -2168
Projected Total Preservation 489 499 509 519 529 540 551 562 573 584
Projected New Construction 300 158 204 257 256 255 253 251 249 247
Annual Total Construction 789 657 713 776 785 794 804 813 822 831
Source: The Major Moves Initiative Plan, 2006.
The revenues from the upfront payment of the MIG lease will be used to pay
outstanding toll bonds and fund the "Major Move" transportation program. According to
the plan, 34 percent of the funding going to the "Major Move" program will be invested
in the seven counties where the facility is located to address equity concerns, based on
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the fact that 66 percent of the traffic comes from out-of-state drivers, so those revenues
can be invested in other areas of the state.
2.5.4.1. Background for the Major Moves Program
Figure 10 reveals a funding gap greater than $1.8 billion over the following ten
years. The governor asked the department to review and prioritize projects on a set of
criteria including safety, mobility, and economic development. In September 2005, a
draft for a new legislature initiative; the Major Moves highway plan was made public.
The plan included more than 200 new construction and 200 major preservation highway
projects.
In addition to funding the gap for Indiana Department of Transportation
(INDOT) highway projects, funds would be made available to counties for local
transportation projects. At that time, an important question was how the State of Indiana
would finance such plans. According to the Major Moves Program, a combination of
federal and state gas tax revenues would help the state to achieve such objective.
Another source of funding was the expected lease proceeds from the ITR. "While the
Toll Road is a significant source of stable cash flows to the State, the State considers
that a private entity may be able to derive more economic value from the asset while
providing excellent service for Toll Road users." (Request for Toll Road Concessionaire
Proposals, Indiana Toll Road (ITR), Sept.28, 2005, p. 12)
Johnson et al. (2007) primarily focus on the refinancing part for the ITR. The
report quotes that "in the ITR, the debt payment has been repetitively deferred as a
result of insufficient revenue flows to fund capital improvements."
Governor Mitch Daniel made toll financing part of his political campaign during
the 2004 elections. To respond to information requests regarding the Major Moves
Initiative, the IFA engaged Crowe Chizek and Company LLC (Crowe) to perform an
independent analysis of toll road operations over a 75 period from 2006 through 2081.
2.6. Accounting for the ITR before June 2006
The Toll Road Project adopted the modified approach for recording information
under Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) statement No.34, Basic
Financial Statements- and Management's Discussion and Analysis- for State and Local
Governments. All expenditures made these assets (except for additions and
improvements) are expensed in the period incurred. However as the ITR financial
statement 2003 mentions that additions and improvements to eligible assets are
capitalized when such improvements increase the capacity or efficiency of infrastructure
assets rather than preserve the useful life of the assets".
It is important to mention that the depreciation in such accounts is computed
using a straight-line method over the estimated useful life. The ITR Concession
Company (ITRCC) adopted a different approach to calculate the depreciation expense
which in return affects the ITR's profitability.
2.7. ITR Ownership Structure up to 2006
Prior to 2006, the Indiana East-West Toll Road Project was the result of a lease
agreement between the Indiana Transportation Finance Authority (ITFA) and INDOT to
finance and operate the Indiana East-West Toll Road as defined in the lease agreement
between the two parties.
2.7.1. Bidding Process for Privatization
The 117-day bid process was the fastest in the country for what now is the
largest agreement of its type for privatization of the ITR. On 23 January 2006, the 50:50
Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG)-Cintra consortium, the Statewide Mobility
Partners LLC, was announced the preferred bidder for the ITR concession. The other
bidders were: Morgan Stanley ($1.90 billion), Itinere ($2.520 billion), and Babcock &
Brown LP ($2.84 billion). On March 14, 2006, the Indiana General Assembly House
and Senate passed House Bill 1008, which allowed the Governor to lease out the ITR.
The winning bid was $3.85 billion, "an enormous amount of money far beyond anything
the state could generate on its own", as the Governor Mitch Daniels described the bid.
The 75-year lease agreement was signed by the State and the concessionaire on April
13, 2006 and closed on June 30, 2006. The consortium created a project finance vehicle,
the ITR Concession Company LLC (ITRCC). The ITRCC entered into a concession
agreement with the IFA to operate the toll road for 75 years.
2.7.2. ITR ownership structure after privatization
In December 2006, MIG completed the divestment of 50 percent of its interests
in its four US toll roads to Macquarie Infrastructure Partners (MIP) for a total amount of
$825 million. The price paid for 25 percent of ITR was $197.8 million.
MIG has a 25 percent direct interest in the Statewide Mobility Partners LLC,
which in turn has a 100 percent interest in the ITRCC. The Statewide Mobility Partners
LLC is treated as a partnership for the US tax purposes. According to the financial
statements, the company operates as a limited liability company and is a disregarded
entity for federal and income tax purposes. The ITRCC is not liable for US federal
income taxes since its members recognize their share of income and loss in their
respective tax returns. Taxes are still paid upstream however.
Figure 11: The ITR Organization structure after the PPP
MIG
(25percent)
I
Source: Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) Analyst Package, 2008
2.7.3. Financing Structure and Capital Structure
According to the Macquarie Bank Limited, the total funding requirement for the
ITR was US$ 4.05 billion. The sources and uses are given below:
Figure 12: Sources for the ITR's concession money
Source: MIG ITR Presentation, ITR 2006
Figure 13: Users of the ITR's concession money
Purchase Price 3850 95.1
Reserves 100 2.5
Other Costs 98.6 2.4
4048.6
Source: The MIG ITR Presentation, 2006
Figure 14: Details about the ITR's financing facility
Acquisition Debt 3278.5
Capex Facility 700
Liquidity Facility 100
Total 4078.5
Source: The MIG ITR's Presentation, 2006
From the above financing review, the tenor of the acquisition debt is nine years.
According to the Macquarie's presentation (ITR), the favorable financing terms includes
commitments to fund estimated capital expenditure (Capex) requirement over the next
nine years.
2.7.4. ITR's Toll-setting mechanism:
The logic behind the ITR's toll-setting regulations was that tolls, prior to the
concessions, had been kept artificially low. The tolls had not kept with the increase in
the cost of living. Hence, the mechanism was set such as in the early years of
concessions, the tolls would be restored to a more appropriate level. Once this was
accomplished, tolls would be adjusted annually by two factors:
a) Inflation (consumer price index (CPI))
b) Or the ability to pay (gross domestic product (GDP)).
As stipulated in the Concession agreement, the Indiana announced the first toll
increase since 1985, to occur on 1 April 2006.
a) Passenger car tolls to increase to 5.1 cents per mile, and will remain
unchanged until 2010.
b) As shown in figure below, commercial vehicle tolls will increase. The
toll schedule would remain same until 2010.
c) The concessionaire's ability to set tolls begins in 2010 with a maximum
increase in 2010 to reflect the prior 4 years Consumer Price Index (CPI)
or nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth
d) And maximum annual toll increase post 2010 is the greater of 2 percent,
CPI and nominal GDP/capita.
The details of the toll-setting mechanism are attached below:
Figure 15: Toll-setting mechanism ITR
1-Apr-07 1-Apir8 1-Apr-09 . 30-Jun-10 30-Jun-11
Source: Tolling Schedule, ITR Concession Agreement, 2006
The ITR Concession Company allocated $3.8 billion paid to the IFA and $23.64
million of other direct costs associated with entering into the Concession and Lease
Agreement to the following assets based upon their relative fair values. The company
used an outside independent appraiser to help determine the fair values of the various
assets associated with the Concession and Lease Agreement.
Passenger Cars
Commercial
Vehicles (5-axle)
1-Ap-06
Table 5: ITR's bid price- breakdown
I Concession rights 30U106b
Source: The ITR's financial statements, 2007-2008
2.8. Financial Performance of the ITR after 2006
In this section, I will employ the same financial measures to evaluate the
financial performance of the ITR as we looked in earlier Section.
The ITR's EBITDA after 2006
Source: P&L statements, 2007&2008
Bridges and Roads 680313
Buildings 22940
Leasehold interest on land 85530
Vehicles 3880
Machinery, tools and equipment 2895
Furniture, fixtures and office equipment 490
Materials (salt and fuel) 560
Total 3823674
1
($ million)
Table 6: P&L - Statewide Mobility Partners LLC and Subsidiary
Statewide Mobility Statewide Mobility
Partners LLC and Partners LLC and
subsidiary subsidiary
Operating Revenues
Tolls 144 147
Concession revenues 8 8
Total operating revenues 151 155
Operating Expenses
General A dministration 5 5
Toll collection 13 11
Administrative services 7 6
Major expense repairs and renovation 9 11
Depreciation expense 78 69
Misc. expense 6
Total operating expenses 118 102
Operating income 33 53
Non-operating revenues (expenses)
Interest and bond amortization expense -239 -244
Gain (loss) on sale of fixed assets -209
Derivative Gain(Loss) 32
Change in net assets before transfer of
assets held on behalf of ITFA -173 -400
Transfers to assets held on behalf of
ITFA-Net Loss -173 -400
Source: Financial statements dated 2007 and 2008.
If I look at the transfers to assets held on behalf of ITFA as an indicator of the
asset's financial performance then the ITR does not seem to be very profitable project.
The interest and amortization expenses are really high. From the financial statements, it
appears that the ITR management capitalized such expenses. It appears that it will take
some time before the toll road operations become profitable. Similar financial situation
is evident from the cash flow position of the asset in two years 2005 and 2006.
($ million)
Table 7: Balance Sheet for Statewide Mobility Partners LLC and Subsidiary
Assets
Current Assets
.Cash and cash equivalents
Accounts Receivable
Prepaid Expenses
Current portion of toll freeze deposit
Total Current Assets
Noncurrent Assets
Restricted cash and investment
Property, Building., and equipment
Advanced payments to contractors
Concession rights, net of amortization
Deferred financing costs
Other noncurrent assets
Total noncurrent assets
Total assets
LIABILITIES AND NET ASSETS
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable
Accrued salaries and related expenses
Current portion of revenue bondspayabl e
Total Current Liabilities
Long .term portion of revenue bonds payable
Assets held on behalf of ITFA:
Invested in capital assets, net of related debt
Due to IFA
Derivative Liability
.Total Liabilities
Accumulated other comprehensive loss
Total Liabilities and net assets
Statewide Mobility
Partners LLC and
subsidiary
2007
5
16
30
78
829
3063
3970
4000
8
16
33
3402.
204
344
548
4000
Statewide Mobility
Partners LLC and
subsidiary
2008
4
8
2
13
27
51
928
20
2926
57
47
4030
4057
12
13
37
3540
47
1926
1978
-1519
4057
Source: Financial statements dated 2007 and 2008.
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Table 8: Cash Flow statement- Statewide Mobility Partners LLC and Subsidiary
($ millions)
Statewide Mobility Partners LLC and S1lubsidiary
Cash inflows (outfl ows) from1| ol)eratin|g
activities
Net Loss -99 -173 -405
Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net
cash cash used in operating activities
Amortization of deferred financing costs
included in interest 5 9 9
Depreciation and amortization of property
and equipment 22 38 29
Amortization of concession rights 20 40 40
Net unrealized loss in hedging activities 39 65 303
Changes to oplerating assets and
liabilities
Accounts Receivable -6 -2 -3
Prepaid expenses and other current assets -13 0 -1
Accounts Payable 1 -3 0
Accrued other liabilities 8 -1 -3
Due to related parties 2 -4 3
Accrued Interest 1 -1 0
Net cash used in operating activties -19 -32 -27
Cash Flows from investing activities
Payments to enter concession and lease
agreement -3820
Advance Payments to contractors -24
Additional purchase of property and
equipment -3 -75 -111
Change in restricted cash and cash reserve
accounts -120 37 28
Net cash used in investing activities -3943 -61 -83
Cash flows fromn financing activities
Capital contributions 760
Distribution and return of capital -29 -29
Proceeds from Series A loan 3248
Proceeds from Series B loan 16 29 28
Proceeds from Series C loan 16 93 110
Financing fees paid -79 0
Net cash flows provided by financing
activties 3961 93 109
Net change in cash -1 0 0
Beginning of Period 0 -1 -1
End of Period -1 -1 -1
Cash paid during the period of interest 68 141 144
Purchase of property and equipment under
liabilities 8 7
Net unrealized loss in hedging activities
charged to other comprehensive income -89 -152 -1278
Source: Cash flow statements dated 2007 and 2008.
2.9. Accounting for the ITR after 2006
For the Statewide Mobility Partners LLC and Subsidiary financial statements,
effective January 01, 2008, the ITRCC changed its method of depreciation for highway-
related property and equipment from straight-line method to modified units of
production method which makes use of traffic volume over an asset's estimated useful
life. Under the new depreciation method for ITRCC, the depreciation of an asset is a
function of both time and usage.
Based on the traffic-based depreciation method, the depreciation expense for the
highway-related assets was $25.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2008. Had
the company continued using the straight-line method of depreciation for highway-
related assets, depreciation expense for highway-related assets would have been $34.1
million for the year ended December 31, 2008.
The success of the transaction has also been Standard and Poor's upgraded
Indiana's credit rating from "AA" to "AA+" on January 23, 2006. Such upgrading in the
rating reflected the state's steadily improving financial position, which exceeds
budgeted expectations, both driven by improved management and revenue growth.
2.10. How the traffic has evolved in 2008?
Given that the ITR concession agreement is ending in 2081, the MIG
management announces the traffic results every year. Because of a number of factors
such as weakening national and economic conditions, surge in retail fuel prices, the toll
elasticity in connection with April 2007 and 2008 toll increases, the volume of traffic in
2008 has experienced a decrease.
Table 9: How traffic has evolved in 2008?
Ticket Traffic (Year to Date)
Years 2006 2007 2008
Traffic 25717 22505 21535
Barrier Traffic (Year to Date)
Years 2006 2007 2008
Traffic 95486 88069 71653
Apr-June Apr-June
2007 2007
Average Daily Traffic
All-Days-All-Das- 25079 26413Tickets
Days-Barrier 70474 98376
Source: Granger, Indiana, June 23, 2008
In the above table, the Ticket System is reported in terms of full-length equivalent tolls
and the barrier system is reported in terms of toll generating transactions.
2.11. Valuation of the ITR
The financial value of a toll road concession is the projected annual cash flow (CF)
generated over the concession period. According to earlier studies, the key parameters
of the concession include
The term of the concession
A projection of gross toll revenues, which is a function of future traffic
and tolls
Operating costs and
And Capital expenditures.
Table 10: ITR performance in 2007
USD in 000's
Tolling Revenues 143380
Concession and 8086
miscellaneous Revenues
7.7 percent higher thanTotal Revenues 151466 2006 revenues
Overhead Expenses 14677
Highway Operations 26077
Expenses
3.1 percent lower thanTotal OPEX 40724 2006 costs
11.8 percent higher thanEBITDA 110742 2006 level
Depreciation and 78291
amortization
EBIT 32451
Interest and other 205885
expenses
EBT -173434
Source: The MIG's presentation to investors, 2007
It is important to note that many earlier studies do not include the toll elasticity of
demand as an important factor in the analysis. The analysis below discusses some earlier
approaches that have been employed to calculate the financial value of the ITR
concession. However each of the study makes different assumptions about the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) from a concessionaire's viewpoint. I will be discussing
their assumptions and how each of these analyses is deficient? In such way, I will
contribute to the existing literature.
2.11.1.Crowe Analysis
When Governor Daniel initiated the Major Moves initiative, many doubts were
raised about the short-term versus long-term benefits of privatization. In response to
such queries, the IFA engaged the services of Crowe Chizek and Company LLC
(Crowe), the 9th largest accounting firm in the US. Crowe's analysis employed the net
present value (NPV) method to calculate the financial value of the toll road. The NPV is
the difference between a project's value and its costs. "Any asset creates wealth if the
discounted value of the future cash flows exceeds the up-front costs" (Brealey, Myers,
and Allen, 2008, p. 143).
The private bidders based their bids on future performance, especially
guaranteed toll rate increases however; the Crowe's analysis is based on past and
current performance of the toll road.
The Crowe's analysis makes key assumptions about traffic volume, operating
expenditure growth, repairs and renovation expense growth based on toll road's
historical trends etc. These assumptions include
a) The toll road's traffic assumptions as reported in study (Wilbur Smith
Associates 2004).
b) The operating expense will grow at 5.1 percent and repair and renovation
expense growth at 2.5 percent.
c) The study assumes that the State of Indiana would invest regularly into
capital improvement $22.6 million per year from 2017 through 2081.
d) The financial analysis assumes a discount rate of 6 percent which the
report claims is the market cost of capital for the State of Indiana debt.
According to the Crowe's analysis, the 6 percent derived from the
20-year historical average weekly rate of the 30-year Municipal Market
Data of 5.8 percent plus 20 basis points based on the current market.
These 20 basis points reflect an adjustment for Indiana credit ratings and
the risk of lease revenue backed debt.
2.11.2. Limitations of the Crowe's Analysis
The government valued the asset based on the present and future performance of
the ITR. According to the report, "it was less than the full productive use of the toll
road" (Johnson et al., 2006)
The limitation of such study is that it incorrectly assumes the cost of capital for
the project is the State of Indiana's cost of debt. Brealey, Myers and Allen (2009) point
out that "the company needs to forecast the project's cash flows and discount them at
the opportunity cost of capital to arrive at the project's NPV" (Chapter 07, p. 143).
For a corporation, the opportunity cost of capital is calculated as the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) which is the average rate of return demanded by
investors in the company's debt and equity. The opportunity cost of capital depends on
risk and it is not equal to a borrowing rate.
Another noted study also supports the above assertion that the Crowe's analysis
does not assume a correct discount rate. The study was carried out by the bipartisan
Pennsylvania Transportation Funding and Reform Commission (PTFRC). Such study is
unique in a sense that it identified the key limitations in a Morgan Stanley Report (2007)
that looked at three scenarios of valuing the Pennsylvania Turnpike.
During the same time period when Governor Mitch Daniel was trying to garner
political support for the Major Moves Initiative, Prof. Roger Skurski, University of
Notre Dame analyzed the Crowe's analysis. His study has also been part of a court
testimony. His stance is that the Crowe's analysis is using an over-estimated cost of
capital estimate i.e. 6 percent versus 4.8 percent. He also argues that the Crowe's
analysis makes very conservative estimate about the traffic growth. According to him,
keeping the operating expense growth constant (5.10 percent), if the IFA's analysis
assumes 4.42 percent versus 2.84 percent for toll rate growth and discount the cash
flows by 4.80 percent versus 6 percent then for IFA, the value of the ITR would $11.38
billion. The key limitation of his analysis is that he assumed the cost of debt to be 4.8
percent which is lower than that of Crowe's. Skurski's testimony also ignores
opportunity cost of capital issue.
Figure 16 Roger Skurski Analysis regarding ITR, 2006
Toll
Toll Rate Traffic Discount Operang Road
Growth 2011- Growth 2031- Rate 2007- Expense Value
2081 2081 2081 Growth NOV
2006-2081 (billions)
Crowe Chizek 2.84 percent 0.55 percent 6.00 percent 5.10 percent $1.92
Crowe Replication: Table 1 2.84 percent 0.55 percent 6.00 percent 5.10 percent $1.95
Crowe Adjusted: Table 1A 2.84 percent 0.55 percent 4.80 percent 5.10 percent $4.12
Crowe Adjusted: Table 1B 2.84 percent 1.10 percent 4.80 percent 5.10 percent $4.73
Crowe Adjusted: Table 2 4.42 percent 0.55 percent 6.00 percent 5.10 percent $5.35
Crowe Adjusted: Table 2A 4.42 percent 1.10 percent 6.00 percent 5.10 percent $6.11
Crowe Adjusted: Table 2B 4.42 percent 1.10 percent 4.80 percent 5.10 percent $11.38
In the table above, 4.80 percent is based on a debt capacity analysis of Ryan
Kitchell, Public Finance Director, Indiana Finance Authority (Critical evaluation of the
Crowe's Analysis, 2007). Roger Skurski's testimony again misses the point about the
opportunity cost of capital.
a) Enright (2007), in a study carried by the NW Financial Group highlights two
drawbacks of the same Crowe's analysis conducted in 2006. These limitations are
a) Reduce operating expenses from 5.1 percent to 3.0 percent.
b) Reduce the costs of capital from 6 percent to 5.3 percent. It
assumes 5.3 percent as the tax-exempt rate for IFA.
---- ---
The above mentioned study again misses the key point regarding the opportunity cost of
capital.
2.12. The Macquarie Financial Model - Indiana Toll Road
In the Macquarie financial model, the equity value of an investment is derived
by discounting future cash flows to equity by an appropriate equity discount rate. The
discount rate is calculated by adding a risk premium (6.0 percent) to a US risk-free rate
(4.07 percent). The cash flows available to equity holders for toll road assets can be
determined using a cash flow cascade as outlined in table below.
Table 11: Cash Flow Cascade (MIG Model)
Kevenue
- Operating costs
= Net operating cash flow (i.e. EBITDA)
- Debt service obligations
- Tax Payments
Capital expenditure
+ Debt drawings
= Cash flow available to equity holders
Source: The MIG's Analyst Package 2006, p. 25
For the ITR, the Macquarie-Cintra consortium (the bidder) projected the toll
road's revenues and expenditures for the period 2006 through 2081. Foote and Bell
(2008) give details of the financial model utilized in determining the toll road value. To
project the toll road's cash flows, the inputs include the term of the concession, a
projection of gross toll revenues, operating costs and capital expenditures. In the
Macquarie model, the gross toll revenues are a function of future traffic volume and
tolls as stated in the Indiana toll road concession and lease agreement (April 12, 2006)
between the IFA and ITR concession company.
2.12.1. How can we calculate the cost of capital for the ITR?
Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2008) explain the steps involved in calculating the
opportunity cost of capital, which is the rate of return the MIG would have gotten if it
would have invested $3.8 billion in some other project of the same risk.
It is the sum of the risk-free rate ( r ) and a premium of risk ( rm - rf ) so for the
ITR, the opportunity cost of capital would be rim (2006) = r r (2006) + beta * market
risk premium ( rm - rf ). According to the Brattle Group, the beta of a toll road is 0.42.
While calculating the above formula, the critical assumption is that there is a normal,
stable risk premium on the market portfolio hence the expected future risk premium can
be measured by the average past market risk premium.
2.12.3. Changes in accounting principles and MIG's Valuation Policy 2006
Until 30 June 2005, the MIG used Australian Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (AGAAP). After 30 June 2005, the MIG adopted International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). In view of IFRS accounting standards, the preparation of
financial statements requires "the use of certain critical accounting estimates" (MIG
financial statements, 2006). Such estimation is related to investments in financial assets.
For example, in determining the interests in unlisted companies and trusts, the analysts
use the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. According to the MIG's valuation policy
2006, MIG values its toll road investments using the DCF. MIG revalues its toll road
investments every six months. These revaluations become part of the directors'
valuation which in turn, is used to calculate MIG's Net Asset Backing (NAB) per
security unit. The change in NAB shows the change in the directors' valuation of each
MIG stapled security. The table below explains how the MIG calculates the NAB.
Table 12: MIG Net Asset Backing Security Reconciliation
I NAB Reconciliation
Plus
Minus
Plus/Minus
Equal
Divide
Equal
Potfolio Valuationl
(Directors valuation)
Market value of non-
concession investments
at MIG Board valuation
Cash at balance date
Base and performance
fees payable at balance
date
Sundry debtors/creditors
Value of MIG Equity
No. of securities
Net Asset Backing
Source: The MIG's Valuation Policy 2006
The directors' valuation relates to determining the risk-premium for various toll
roads. The MIG's accounting policy gives the directors' discretion to do so. They can
carry out re-valuation of the asset in the same case. As shown in table below, a small
change in risk premium brings about relatively greater change in the NAB value per
security unit.
| =
Figure 17. Net Asset Backing Security, 2008
407 ETR
M6 Togl
APRR
Westilnk M7
Dulles Greenway
Indiana Toll Road
Chicago Skyway
Lusoponte
..... ....................  
South Bay Expressway
Wamow
Transtoll
Portfolio Risk Premium
Portfolio valuation
Non-investment balances
Distribution (6 months)
Portfolio valuation
Net Asset Backing per security
4.25%
5.259
6.00%
5.00%
8.50%
6.00%
6.00%
4.00%
9.50%
7.00%
nia
5.16%
0 75% 3,295
0.75% 2,188
- 982
- 802
1 50% 398
- 344
0.50% 236
1.20% 188
250% 133
2.00% 2
- 2
0.63% -
8,569
897
(240)
9,226
$3.84
Source: The MIG's financial statements, 2008.
For the DCF, one important aspect is estimating the discount rate. The discount
rate is calculated as the sum of risk free rate and a risk premium. Based on the Analyst's
model (2006) and as shown in table above, it appears that the MIG does not use a
constant market risk premium. According to the MIG's Analyst's Package (2006), "the
risk premium reflects the uncertainty associated with the cash flows". These risk-
premiums vary with the stage of development of the toll roads.
According to MIG's analyst's package, 2006, p.9, "The risk premium for each
asset is individually determined by the Board and reflects the uncertainty associated
with the road's cash flows".
3 770
3.026
1,079
776
468
355
307
236
187
3
1
4.53%
10,209
1,121
(242)
11,088
$4.59
Figure 18: The varying risk-premiums of the toll roads (a )and (b)
Stage in Toll
Road Life Cycle
Risk Premium
Dulles Greenway Ramp-up 7.50%
South Bay Expressway Construction 7.50%
Chicago Skyway Ramp-up 6.00%
VWarnow Tunnel Ramp-up 6.509%
Westlink. M7 Ramnp-up 5.50%
M6 Toll Ramrrp-up 5.00%9
407 ETR Ramp-up 4.00%
Vasco de Gama Bridge Ramp-up 3.00%
25th April Bridge Growth 2.50%
APRR Growth 18.00%
Indiana Toll Road Ramp-up 7.80%
ASSET VALUE
Source: The MIG Analyst's package 2006
As in later chapters, we will value the Chicago Skyway, for which the MIG
assumes relatively smaller risk-premium than the average market risk-premium. The
result is a higher asset value and thus higher quoted bid price.
2.13. Macquarie Infrastructure Group in 1996
MIG was formed to enable private investors to participate in the growth
associated with infrastructure assets. According to the MIG's Advisory Deed (2009),
Asset
"MIG's principal investment policy is investment in infrastructure assets in
OECD and OECD equivalent countries; and non-infrastructure assets where ancillary
to a major infrastructure investment or acquisition. However MIG has a stated focus on
toll road investments, both greenfield and mature."
The OECD stands for Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
The Macquarie Bank created MIG in December 1996. In that year, MIG listed
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) at $1.00 per security unit, a stapled security.
According to MIG Financial Report (2009), the MIG defines stapled securities as two or
more investments that are quoted and traded as if they are a single instrument. The
securities consisting of one or more investment vehicles managed by a third party are
registered in Australia under the Managed Investment Acts and must trade together on
the ASX. Prior to 21 September, 2000, MIG was a dual-stapled structure comprised of a
unit in Macquarie Infrastructure Trust I (MIT (I)) and a unit in Macquarie Infrastructure
Trust II MIT (II), with MEI plc being a wholly owned company of MIT (II). In 21
September 2000 MIG became a triple-stapled structure. It consists of a unit in MIT (I), a
unit in MIT (II), and a share in Macquarie Infrastructure Group International Limited
(MIGIL). For 2005-2006, MIG was a triple- stapled security. The two trusts, MIT (I)
and MIT (II) are managed by Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Limited
(MIIML). The MIIML is a wholly owned subsidiary of Macquarie Bank Limited
(MBL).
The group has gone through a series of restructurings. It is important to provide a
summary of such restructurings because they show how taxes play an important role for
MIG. This fact has an indirect bearing on the valuation of the toll roads.
2.13.1. Restructuring of the Macquarie Infrastructure Group in 2005
Since its inception in 1996, the MIG in 12 January 2005 restructured its
corporate structure. Under such corporate arrangement, the investors' shareholding in
Macquarie European Infrastructure plc (MEIP) was replaced by shareholdings in
Macquarie Infrastructure Bermuda Limited (MIBL). According to the details in
Management Report (2005), the MIG proposed such restructuring to achieve three
objectives. Firstly, such structure would enable the distribution of proceeds from the
sale of Cintra. Cintra is a subsidiary of listed Spanish construction company, Ferrovial
Group. Secondly, the restructuring would also enable more timely and efficient
distributions from MIBL. Most importantly, Bermuda is a more appropriate holding
company jurisdiction since it does not impose taxes on dividends and capital gains.
Details are attached below:
Figure 19: The triple-stapled security in 2005-2006
Source: The MIG's presentation to Investors, "MIG Corporate Structure 2005"
Table 13: Tax Benefits entailed in new organization structure:
Receipt of Dividends
Underlying tax
credits required,
otherwise 30
percent UK tax
Tax Exempt
Subject to corporate
Subject only to a
Payment of Dividends law distributable
solvency test
reserve restricts
UK Capital Gains
Capital Gains Tax exemption may Tax Exempt
not apply
Australian Accruals taxation Exempt Foreign Exempt Foreign
for Australian Investors Investment Fund Investment Fund
Source: The MIG presentation to the investors, 2006.
According to the MIG Management Report (2009), the market value (MV) of the
funds is calculated as the volume weighted average (VWA) market capitalization over
last 10 Australian stock exchange trading days of each quarter plus fund level
borrowings and Index in any financial year firm commitments for future investments
less cash or cash equivalents. If MIG index outperforms the Standard and Poor
(S&P)/ASX 300 industrials Accumulation then according to the MIG Management
Report (2009), the performance fee is payable.
According to the MIG's Advisory Deed (2009), the manager calculates base fee as
follows:
a) 1.25 percent per annum of market value of the funds up to $3 billion and
b) And 1 percent per annum of market value of the funds in excess of $3 billion.
2.13.2 Key Developments in 2006
A series of deals took place during 2006. It may not be wrong to infer that
through a series of such deals, MIG consolidated its position as one of leading toll road
developers. The nature of such deals included refinancing and institutional placements.
It is important to give a short summary of such deals, since the later chapters will
attempt to value the ITR and the Chicago Skyway at the time when the sale took place
i.e. in 2006. The summary of such events might help in investigating how the valuation
of the two toll roads had been impacted if the investor were other than MIG.
On 17 August 2005, MIG announced the refinancing of debt for Chicago
Skyway. Such financing structure provided an immediate return of US$168.2 million of
cash to MIG. On 9 September 2005, MIG invested US $153.7 million to acquire the
General Partner, Shenandoah Greenway Corporation. On 29 September 2005, MIG
acquired a further 13.3 percent interest in Toll Road Investors Partnerships II, L.P.
(TRIP II) from Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) for US$ 84.5 million. On 1 September
2005, MIG raised A$667.5 million, net of transaction and underwriting costs from an
institutional placement of 174.4 million MIG stapled securities. On 16 December 2005,
MIG exercised its fixed price option to acquire an additional 5percent equity interest in
Westlink M7 for A$47.4 million. During this time, MIG also had access to new non-
recourse loans. These loans included US$ 150 million ED funding Trust (EDFT), M5
Holdings Funding Trust (M5FT) US$125 million, a term-debt facility $515 million etc.
It is relevant to mention that the MIG did not invest much in the leasehold
improvements during 2005-2006.
2.14. MIG's Analyst Package 2006
The Macquarie Model includes various sections: economics, valuation of toll
road assets, the asset summary, and fund summary. The economics sheet includes
information about key parameters such as consumer price index (CPI), floating interest
rates, risk-free rates in respective countries etc. The asset summary provides information
about operating cash flows and returns to equity regarding each toll road. Lastly, the
fund summary provides consolidated operating cash flows of all toll roads.
Table 14: The MIG's Analyst Package, 2006
Dulles
Greenway
LujsPonte
iT
Source: The MIG's Analyst Package, 2006
In the above table, APRR refers to Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhone and ReCNs
refers to Reset Convertible Notes.
IWarnow
Tunnel
,~~, _~,__ _____ I, ~~~ ,___I __
2.15. Summary
From above analysis, it becomes evident that the ITR was not facing any serious
financial setback right before the lease took place in 2006. Most of the oft-cited prior
literature does not correctly estimate the cost of capital.
CHAPTER 3
INDIANA TOLL ROAD - VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE ITR
VALUATION
In Chapter 2, I critically reviewed the various analyses employed to calculate the
ITR's value from the concessionaire's viewpoint. From the previous chapter, it becomes
evident that given the toll rates and the term of concession is 75 years for the ITR, there
are two key drivers for the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. These variables
include
a) The ITR's traffic volume in response to the given toll rates. The toll
schedule is given in the ITR's concession agreement. It is the toll
elasticity of demand.
b) The cost of capital.
Once the traffic forecast is set, then the cost of capital becomes the key driver in
the DCF analysis. If we have the cost of capital determined then it will be interesting to
see how the value of the same toll road changes when the ownership of the asset
changes.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a couple of questions. First, if we are
employing the discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation technique to determine the ITR's
value, then how does the ITR's value change under various scenarios? When the IFA
submitted the request for the toll road concessionaire proposals dated September 25,
2008, it stated the rationale for such deal, "While the Toll Road is a significant source of
stable cash flows to the State, the State considers that a private entity may be able to
derive more economic value from the asset" (The Indiana toll road concessionaire
proposal, September 25, 2005).
For my thesis, I define the economic value of the ITR as the financial value of
the toll road. To calculate the ITR's value, firstly I employ the net present value method
(NPV) as the Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) adopted such methodology in
arriving at the ITR's value. I use the cash flow (CF) stream in the Macquarie financial
model. Brealey, Myers and Allen (2009) mention four steps of such procedure:
a) Forecast after-tax CFs, assuming all-equity financing. When we analyze
the project as if it were all equity-financed, it means that all CFs as
coming from the stakeholders and all cash inflows as going to them.
b) Assess the project's risk.
c) Estimate the opportunity cost of capital.
d) Calculate the NPV using the opportunity cost of capital.
It is important to mention that the value of the cost of capital changes under each
approach. In the previous chapter, I identified the way by which we can calculate the
cost of capital by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The equation is given
by
CAPM = risk free rate at 2006 (rf) + P * (market risk premium)
Where the risk free rate r is = 4.52 percent, 8 = 0.42 (the Brattle Group, Inc.
2009) and the market risk premium for the ITR is given by 7.6 percent. For the
calculation, I assumed the values of such variables at the time of the transaction, 2006. I
have calculated the opportunity cost of capital using the above equation.
For the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, I analyze the following scenarios:
a) Scenario 1: The IFA keeps the toll road by itself. I assume the same toll
agreement schedule for the IFA as for the concessionaire.
b) Scenario 2: The IFA sells the toll road to a private operator (the MIG).
Being a private operator, the MIG has to pay both federal and state taxes.
To determine the value of such scenario, I consider three cases: firstly I
determine the value of the toll road using the after-tax WACC. It is
inclusive of interest-tax shields. For such analysis, I am assuming that the
concessionaire is rebalancing the debt to value ratio continuously.
Secondly, I argue that the adjusted present value (APV) method is a
better way to calculate the value than NPV based on WACC. I also show
APV results using the risk neutral valuation and Monte Carlo Simulation.
c) Scenario 3: The State of Indiana finances the purchase of the toll road
with tax-exempt debt. For such scenario, I assume that the purchase value
of the toll road is $3.956 billion, the bid price which the MIG paid for the
ITR.
d) Scenarios 4 and 5: I define efficiency as in Geltner and Moavenzadeh
(1987). The MIG is more efficient if it can reduce operating expenditures
or increase toll revenues.
3.1. Assumptions of the Macquarie Financial Model
Before I calculate the ITR's value under each approach, I will mention the key
assumptions about barrier and ticket systems under the Macquarie financial model. The
key assumptions include, for the barrier system
a) The traffic growth is 2 percent.
b) The traffic mix is 80 percent/20 percent, the proportion of the cars and
trucks. In view of the changing economic conditions, such assumptions
need to be flexible, however.
For the ticket system, that the assumptions are
a) The traffic mix is 80 percent/20 percent.
In 2006, when the MIG prepared the financial model, it assumed the US nominal GDP
rate to be 4 percent. In view of the present weak economic conditions, this percentage is
liable to change. Before proceeding to calculating the value of the toll road, I present my
approach of calculating the toll road value in form of a conceptual diagram.
Figure 20: Various Approaches to value the Indiana toll road
The value of the
Indiana toll road
Pretax - The Indiana
Finance Authority
Simple NPV
(after tax-
WACC)
Adjusted present
value (APV)
APV including
tax loss carry
forwards
(TLCFs)
Monte Carlo
Simulation
The state of Indiana finances the
purchase by the tax-exempt debt.
After tax value to
the
concessionaire
(The MIG)
ri
3.2. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
For the ITR's analysis, I will use the cash flows prepared by the MIG. The
impetus for such deals is that the private operator can derive more financial value from
the toll road operations as compared to the IFA, the public entity. One interesting way to
approach such problem is to see how the ITR's value changes when the ownership of
the toll road changes. Such analysis will provide answers to following questions:
a) Is the ITR of greater financial value when the Indiana Finance Authority keeps
the toll road by itself?
b) When the state leases the toll road to a private operator, the taxes are triggered.
The calculated value of the toll road will represent the ITR's value to the MIG.
By comparing the above two scenarios (a) and (b), we will be able to determine
whether the ITR's value is greater when the IFA keeps the toll road by itself or when the
MIG acquires and operates the toll road for 75 years.
Scenario 3 refers to the scenario when the IFA decides to utilize its tax-exempt debt
to finance the purchase of the toll road. The MIG financed the ITR's purchase by
taxable debt. Such scenario is telling us what the state of Indiana is giving up by losing
the advantage of being able to borrow at the tax-exempt rate.
The ITR's management 2008 claimed that under its operations, the toll road had
started operating more efficiently with at decreased operating expenses and higher toll
revenues. Scenarios 4 and 5 analyze by what percentage the MIG has to raise the toll
revenues so that the toll road becomes financially valuable. So that the financial value of
the toll road to the IFA given that we assume the same toll increases according to the
ITR's management is $3.956 billion. Similarly by what percentage the MIG has to
reduce the operating expenditures so that for the MIG, the value of the toll road also
becomes $3.956 billion. I will summarize the five scenarios for the ITR's valuation at
the end of the section.
3.2.1. The value of the Indiana toll road (ITR) in MM's world (no taxes):
Such scenario is applicable to the IFA/INDOT if they operate the toll road using
the toll rates mechanism as stipulated in the concession agreement. The IFA being a
public entity does not have to pay either state or federal taxes. Such scenario resembles
the perfect world of Modigliani Miller (MM) where the financing does not matter.
MM's proposition 1 says that the value of the ITR does not depend how the ITR assets
are financed.
Balance sheet (Market value) - ITR
ITR (present value of after- Debt
tax cash flows) Equity
Total assets Total value
Under such scenario, we can calculate the toll road's value by discounting the
free cash flows (FCF) using the unlevered cost of capital. We can calculate the FCFs as:
Free cash flow (FCF) = Total revenues - total operating expenditures - deprec ion -
capital expenditure (CAPEX) + depr ation.
In absence of taxes, we determine the cost of capital r, by using the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM),
ra = rf + 8(rm - rf)
ra = 4.52 + 0.42 * 7.6 = 7.7
And (r, - rf) = market risk- premium. The long-run average risk premium at the time
of the transaction is 7.6 percent which I use in my calculations below (see Brealey,
Myers and Allen, 2008).
Table 15: Value of the ITR to IFA
10,735 17,244 27,713 44,514 34,840 151,483Revenues
Operating
Expenditures 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 56,929
Operating Profit 1,482 2,758 4,363 6,917 10,964 17,398 27,587 22,666 94,858
Capex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Depreciation 34 36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
FCF 1,516 2,793 4,401 6,956 11,005 17,441 27,632 22,694 95,160
NPV@ 7.7 percent = $3.956 billion
Such is the toll road's value to the IFA given the toll increases as stipulated in the
concession agreement. Since the IFA does not have to pay taxes hence we regard the
$3.956 billion as the pretax value of the ITR.
3.2.2. Normal Net Present Value (NPV) - After tax WACC
The after-tax weighted average cost of capital is
After-tax WACC = rd * ( - Tc) * eD
V V
2.325 4,159 6,680
percent
These are the values of the variables at the time the transaction took place in 2006.
ITR's financing arrangement (a)
Sources US$
Bank Debt 3278 (81 percent)
Equity 770 (19 percent)
Total
ITR's financing arrangement (b)
Uses US$
Purchase Price 3850 or 95.1 percent
Reserves 100 or 2.5 percent
Other Costs 98.6 or 2.4 percent
Total 4048
re = The cost of equity
rd = The cost of debt
ra = the return on assets
rf = The risk free rate
WACC = Weighted average cost of capital
Debt (D) = the market value of debt
Equity (E) = the market value of equity
D
re = ra + (ra - rd )* E
re = 7.74 + (7.74 - 6.7) 3.3
0.78
re = 12.14 Percent
After-tax WACC=6.70 * (1-0.40) * 0.80+12.14 * 0.20 =6 percent
The after-tax cost of debt captures the interest tax shields. The cost of debt (rd)
is the market interest rate on its existing debt and on any new borrowing. The cost of
equity (re) is the expected rate of return demanded by investors for ITR. The above
formula assumes that the concessionaire, the MIG is constantly rebalancing its debt.
Under such scenario, I will calculate the ITR's value using the after-tax WACC. This
value is after tax, but includes interest tax shields.
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008) explain that when we consider taxes, the debt
policy becomes relevant. For the ITR's analysis, taxes constitute an important factor.
Other capital structure determinants such as information or incentive problems do not
matter for the ITR. When the IFA sells the asset to the MIG, the pie gets divided. There
is a third slice, the government's. The expanded balance sheet (in market values)
becomes as explained below:
Expanded Balance Sheet (ITR)
Pretax Indiana toll road value Debt
(PV of pretax cash flows) Equity
The government's claim (the
present value of future taxes).
Total pretax assets Total pretax value
Anything that the concessionaire can do to reduce the size of the government's
liability will make the stockholders better off. One way to achieve such objective is to
borrow money, since the interest is tax deductible. Hence by doing so, the
concessionaire will reduce its tax bill.
For the ITR's analysis, we have assumed the permanent debt in the MIG's deal
i.e. ($3.28 billion) for 75 years. Brealey, Myers and Allen (2009) mention the downside
of this assumption. The firm's ability to carry the debt changes over time as the profits
and firm value changes. The firm cannot use the interest tax shields unless there will be
future profits to shield and there always remains great uncertainty about the firm's
future profitability.
Addressing the discussion under Scenario 2, when the IFA sells the asset to
the MIG (2009) then taxes are triggered. The MIG has to pay both the federal and the
state taxes, equal to 40percent. When the project uses debt, the interest that the company
pays is a tax deductible expense and the tax shields become valuable. The after-tax
value of the project goes up by the present value of tax shields. The magnitude of the tax
shields depends on two factors: the corporate tax rate (T) and the ability of the ITR's
project to earn enough to cover interest payments.
For such scenario, the after-tax WACC calculated above no longer is the
correct approach to calculate the cost of capital of the toll road. It is because certain
assumptions do not hold, then the after-tax WACC fails to give an accurate estimate
such as in the project ITR since it does not have the same risk or capital structure as the
MIG has. For such scenario, Brealey, Myers, Allen (2009) recommend that the adjusted
present value (APV) is the correct approach of computing net present value (NPV),
rather than after-tax WACC.
Brealey, Myers and Allen explain such method as "Once the base-case value
is set, then each financing side effect is traced out, and the present value of its cost or
benefit to the firm is calculated. Finally, all the present values are added together to
estimate the project's total contribution to the value of the firm ". (Brealey, Myers,
Allen, 2008, p. 546)
Value of the ITR project = After-tax value of the all equity-financed project + the
present value (PV) of tax shields.
I have assumed the cost of debt rd = 6.7 percent. It is the yield on the Baa
corporate utility bond yield at the time the transaction took place (2006). I assume that the
PV of the all-equity financed project is represented by the PV (2). Let PV (2) be the after-
tax value of the all equity-financed project. Then, the APV equation becomes APV =
PV (2) + PV of taxes saved by deducting rdD, at rd = 6.7 percent. The PV (2) = $ 2.350
billion, the value of an all-equity financed project being discounted at the opportunity cost
of capital while the present value of tax shields is $1.322 billion. The value of the asset
comes out to be $ 3.77 billion. As the taxes are triggered, despite the increases in the toll
rates and the traffic volumes, the value of the toll road goes down by $0.186 billion. It
turns out that interest tax shields affect almost all of the ITR's tax liabilities.
Revenues 2,325 4,159 6,680 10,735 17,244 27,713 44,514 34,840 151,483
Operating 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 56,929Expenditures
Operating Profit 1,482 2,758 4,363 6,917 10,964 17,398 27,587 22,671 94,858
CAPEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Taxes 579 1,089 1,730 2,751 4,369 6,942 11,017 9,057 36,221
Depreciation 34 36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
FCF 936 1,705 2,670 4,205 6,636 10,499 16,615 13,641 57,338
NPV @ 6 percent = $ 3.77 billion
3.2.3. Simple Adjusted Present value (APV)
Under the standard normal APV procedure, we move towards simpler adjusted
present value (APV). Unlike the WACC calculation assumed that the debt will be
maintained at a constant, we do not have to keep debt at a constant proportion of value.
The toll road value is $3.73 billion.
Under above approach, while calculating the tax shields, I do not take into
account TLCFs.
3.2.4. Adjusted Present value (APV) with tax loss carry forwards (TLCFs)
The toll road value is $3.54 billion. The results are reported in Appendix 1. It is
at the end of the chapter.
3.2.5. Monte Carlo Simulation
It is a more sophisticated way of calculating APV with tax loss carry forwards
(TLCFs). For such analysis, the two scenarios include
a) The pretax value of the ITR
b) And when taxes are triggered.
APV Components Total ($ billion)
PV (2) 2.410
PV of tax shields 1.322
3.732
One way to investigate the project financing of the ITR is by using the Monte
Carlo Simulation. Due to the path-dependent nature of such particular investment, and
the complication of some underlying variables, it is useful to use simulation in order to
generate a probability distribution of possible outcomes. The scenarios include
a) Pretax value of ITR
b) When taxes are triggered
3.2.6. Risk Neutral Valuation
The toll road's value in pretax scenario is $3.95 billion. The detail is in
Appendix 02.
3.2.6.1. Monte Carlo Simulation
In Table 1, I model risky corporate investment under a system of the tax carry
forwards of operating losses. The earlier analytical and empirical studies suggest that
treatment of such losses is important for investment. For setting up the simulation, I
define the project's tax bill as
a) It pays positive taxes only if taxable income exceeds its total stock of carry
forwards.
b) It pays zero taxes if taxable income is positive and less than its total stock of
carry forwards.
Figure 21: Firm with tax loss carry forward (TLCF)
Tax Bill
Taxable Income (TI)
In 1985 and 1987, Myers and Majd investigated the impact of tax
asymmetries. The tax asymmetries refer to the lack of full loss offsets. They modeled
the government's tax claim on the firm's pretax cash flows as a series of path-dependent
call options. In their paper, they explained the method of valuing such call options by
the option pricing procedures and the Monte Carlo Simulation. Such analysis becomes
important in for the ITR's analysis where we are dealing with a stand-alone project.
Under the certainty equivalent method (CEQ), the model specification can be
listed down as:
Figure 22: Specification of the model
Revenues
Simulated for both types of traffic
- barrier and ticket systems.
Fixed costs (FC), Variable costs
2 Operating expenditures (Opex) (VC) = A* traffic volume where A
is a certain percentage
3 Operating income
4 Taxable income =(3)-depreciation-interest
5 Tax [t = 40 percent]
FCF (Available to both debt
6 =(3)-(5) +depreciation
holders and equity holders)
For running such simulation, we need to address two questions:
a) What is the direction due to the tax asymmetry, magnitude?
b) How the answers change if the change is up or down or how the debt policy
changes?
In light of Myers and Majd (1985) paper, the null hypothesis is that as the
variance increases, the present value of taxes ought to increase. As we look at the table
below, we get the same results for the ITR. We regard ITR as a stand-alone project.
($ thousands)
Figure 23: ITR Monte Carlo Simulation Results 5000 trials
15 No debt Half Debt3 percent 8 percent percent 20 percent
PV of FCF 3657814 3431460 3302927 2736663 2387094 2313759
PV of 207294 343639 562181 1128445 1478014 1551349
Taxes
From above table, we can calculate the value of interest tax shields:
1478014-207294 = 1270720 or $ 1.27 billion.
ITR- Results of Monte Carlo Simulation - 5000 Trials
4000000
3500000
3000000 -
= 2500000
-- *- PV of FC F2000000
- - - PV of Taxes
1500000 . ..- - - M
1000000
500000 --. -a
0
3 percent 8 percent 15 percent 20 percent
No debt Half Debt
Variables- Volatility and magnitude of debt
3.2.6.2. Scenario 03: When the state of Indiana finances the purchase of toll
road with the tax-exempt debt
Under such scenario, I will calculate by how much value the State of Indiana
could have achieved by retaining the ITR and fully utilizing its debt capacity by issuing
tax-exempt debt. For such scenario, I use 4.45 percent as the tax-exempt rate. This rate
is the interest rate for BBB bonds in 2006. The maturity of such bonds is 20 years. Since
the term of the concession is 75 years hence I am using the bond rate with longer
maturity. The below NPV calculation explains how much this opportunity is worth. As
explained in table below, the opportunity is worth $ 1.217 billion.
Cost of tax-exempt debt=4.45 percent
The pretax value of the toll road is $ 3.956 billion. This is the value of the toll
road to IFA. I assume that the IFA can borrow against 80 percent of the toll road value
hence it comes out to be $ 3.956 * 0.80 = $ 3.165 billion. For such option, the debt
advantage comes out to be $ 1.217 billion. As we add the pretax value of the toll road to
the above calculated value, the value of ITR comes out to be $ 5.173 billion.
Table 16- Calculating the debt advantage of $1.217 billion
$ Thousands
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408
Interest 0 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 316408
Interest 140861 140861. 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408
Interest 140861 1 40861 1. 40861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408
interest 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408
Interest 140861 140861. 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059
Debt 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408 3165408-In t1.e Ire Ist .... 14 ,0§ ..... . 1 408 6- 1 -4 086 11 -. 1..... 086i .... 1 140.8 6 11i 1.. .. :146861 ......140861' '11i40 61 .. ....8i-4686i
Interest 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861 140861
2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077
Debt 3165408 3165408 2848867 2532326 2215786 1899245 1582704 1266163 949622.4
Interest 140861 140861 140861 126775 112689 98602 84516 70430 56344
2078 2079 2080 2081
Debt 633081.6 316540.8 0
Interest 42258 28172 14086
When we discount the interest payment stream at 6.7 percent then the debt advantage
comes out to be $ 1.217 billion. So the total value of ITR comes out to be $ 5.173
billion.
3.2.6.3. Scenario 4 - When the operator becomes more efficient by lowering
the operating expenditures
The operating expenditures are reduced by thirty percent.
Revenues 2,325 4,159 6,680 10,735 17,244 27,713 44,514 34,840
Operating 616 1,009 1,654 2,710 4,440 7,276 11,922 8,568 40,073
Expenditures
Operating 1,743 3,185 5,064 8,065 12,845 20,480 32,637 26,295 111,713
Profit
CAPEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Taxes 684 1,260 2,010 3,210 5,121 8,175 13,037 10,507 44,563
Depreciation 34 36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
FCF 1,093 1,961 3,091 4,894 7,764 12,348 19,645 15,816 66,692
3.2.6.4. Scenario 5 - When the operator becomes more efficient by levying
higher tolls
In case, the private operator can charge higher tolls, i.e. eleven percent.
Revenues 2,578 4,611 7,406 11,903 19,119 30,726 49,355 38,629 171,176
Operating 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 56,928Expenditures
Operating 1,735 3,210 5,090 8,085 12,840 20,412 32,428 26,460 110,259
Profit
CAPEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Taxes 680 1,270 2,021 3,218 5,119 8,148 12,953 10,573 45,699
Depreciation 34 36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
FCF 1,088 1,976 3,106 4,906 7,761 12,307 19,520 15,915 66,579
($ Thousand)
Table 17: Comparison of various scenarios
Vam of the troad
(in bilion doltars)
Weighted average
cost of camal
(WACC)
The varaes (in the Free Cash Flow)
Tatiti
Rw~
Total
Operating
Expendtes
Total
Operatig
Prof
Taxes
The value of the Indiana toll
In the absence of Taxes road to the IFA (the public 3.956 7.7 percent 151,483,341 56,928,576 94,858,419
entity)
Normal NPV -After-tax WACC 3.771 6 percent 151,483,341 56,928,576 94,858,419 36,221,985
Cost of equity - 7.7
When the taxes are triggered. Normal APV 3.732 percent, the cost of 151,483,341 56,928,576 94,858,419 37,821,906
debt=6.78 percent
Cost of equity - 7.7
Normal APV with TLCFs 3.541 percent, the cost of 151,483,341 56,928,576 94,858,419 37,821,906
debt=6.78 percent
If the State of Indiana finances The cost of debt is the
the tollroad via tax-exempt 5.173 tax-exempt debt worth
debt.The value of the toll road is 4.45 percent.
reduced to
By APV (TLCFs)- ( The Cost of equity - 7.7
operating expenditures are 3.956 percent, the cost of 151,483,341 40,073,459 111,713,538 44,563,953
In the case, the private operator reduced by 30 percent) debt=6.78 percent
can be more efficient By MonteCarlo Simulation -(risk-free rate 4.52
The operating expenditures are percent
reduced by 11.2 percent)
By APV (TLCFs)- ( The private Cost of equity - 7.7
operator has to increase tolls 3.956 percent, the cost of 171,176,176 56,928,576 109,703,546 45,699,040
In the case, the private operator by 11 percent) debt=6.78 percent
can charge higher tolls. By MonteCarlo Simulation -( risk-free rate 4.52
The private operator has to percent
increase tolls by 6.2 percent)
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1,312,000
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Scenaro: With Taxes
Total Revenues
Total Operating Expenditures
Total Operating Expenditures(w/o Dep.)
Operating Profit
Tax (40%)
Interest
Net Income [gperating Income-Interest]
Tax
Tax Indiana is actually paying
Tax Loss Carry forward
Interest tax shield
77208
69500
66183
1 1025
218120
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0
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87248
From the view of Macquarie
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Monte Carlo Simulation
I assume that the traffic volume follows a geometric Brownian motion. I
can define such procedure as
volume(+) = volt * (1 + drift) * (1+ J(,+l) * volatility) Where we are assuming
volatility = 3 percent, drift = 1 percent so volume (t+l) becomes
volume(), = 100 * (1 + 0.01) *(1 + (-0.1713 * 0.03) Where we assume that vol 0= 100.
The simulation works as follows:
The output per iteration = FCF, +I. For each period t, we project the mean simulated FCF
,. We discount FCF, at the risk free rate 4.52 percent. I assume the volatility is 3
percent.
Figure 24: Fittingthe trend line
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Through the careful inspection of ITR documents and the Macquarie financial model, I
have set up a simple model to represent the possible cash flows over the 75 years
concession period. This portion of the chapter details the setup of such model and it
further explains the incorporation of the model into the Monte Carlo simulation. The
Monte Carlo Simulation is a better way of calculating the APV.
Under the DCF analysis, a clear need is established for a more sophisticated
valuation model in order to accurately estimate the value of interest tax shields. The
analysis below explains that the Monte Carlo Simulation is presented as a very viable
solution. Such type of sensitivity analysis would be of particular interest to the investors
who are faced with the challenge of trying to evaluate the potential cash flows of a
similar type of investment.
According to the MIG's financing experience, the debt was incurred in the
initial period of the investment and it was paid off annually through the ten years. The
interest payments were a fixed percentage of the remaining principal each year. An
important consideration is the determination of tax that the concessionaire has to pay
over the concession period. The above problem can be explained in three equations:
a) If 4 <= 0, (5) = 0, (5A) = (5A) (t-) + (4)
b) If 4 > 0, and (4) < -(5A) t-, (5) = 0, and (5A) = (5A) ,1_ - (4)
c) If (4) > 0, and (4) >= (- (5A),_ -1), (5) =0, tax = 0.40 * ((4) - (5A,_-))
Where the (4) = taxable income, 5 = tax, and 5A = Tax loss carry forward (TLCF)
The above specified conditions demonstrate the challenging issue of path -
dependence. The concessionaire would pay the tax if and only if the above conditions
would be satisfied. The future tax stream is directly dependent on all previous cash
flows. The project model focuses on the NPV of the pretax value of the project as well
as the PV of the taxes in the post-tax scenario. For such analysis, I look at two main
input values: the variance of cash flows and the magnitude of the firm's debt
The simulations were rerun with each of these quantities varied. For such
case, the Monte Carlo Simulation enables us to more accurately determine the value of
interest tax shields, once the taxes are triggered. Since the stream of future cash flows
relies directly on knowledge of all prior cash flows hence the path dependence is
difficult to value because certain criteria are evaluated with each forthcoming cash flow.
Such evaluation directly involves the series of the previous cash flows. At each point in
time, the criteria determine whether or not the series is continued based on the current
cash flow, as well as the previous stream of cash flows. A critical aspect of the project is
that it establishes a path- dependent investment opportunity. In general, the use of
Monte Carlo Simulation provides the means to avoid difficulties that would arise in a
complicated setting.
Structure and Input Variables:
Before running the Monte Carlo Simulation, the project model was set up to
portray the series of cash flows extending from year zero to seventy-five years. Each
cash flow node is a simple estimation of revenue minus fixed costs. I have assumed the
risk free rate to be 4.52 percent indicating the safe return of a US treasury bond. The
standard deviation represents the degree of uncertainty of cash flows. Initially, the
standard deviation was set up at 3 percent. I assume that the cash flows follow a
Geometric Brownian (GB) motion (we also call it the random walk). The mathematical
form for the GB motion is
dS = ,uSdt + oSdz Where S is the stock price, u is the expected return on the
stock, a is the volatility of the stock price, and dz is the basic Wiener process. We
assume the drift rate to be 1 percent per annum and the volatility is assumed to be 3
percent.
Appendix 2
Risk Neutral Method
The pretax value of the ITR is $3.956 billion.
Risk free rate = 4.52 percent
CEQ refers to the certainty equivalent ratio = (l+.0452)' (1 + 0.078)'
Cash flows (CFs) @ 4.52 percent = $3.956 billion
Table continued
$ Thousands
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Volume 70865 144073 183232 207211 229786 250601 263464
Concession Revenues 5634 6146 7752 8757 9995 10480 10990
Other Revenues 709 773 975 1102 1257 1318 1382
Revenue 77208 150993 191959 217069 241038 262400 275836
Certainty equivalent
revenues 74858 141944 174965 191832 206533 217996 222185
Fixed Costs 35000 36772 38633 40589 42644 44803 47071
Variable Costs 34500 36247 38082 40009 42035 44163 46399
Costs 69500 73018 76715 80599 84679 88966 93470
Costs wlo depreciation 66183 69683 73361 77227 81289 85558 90044
Costs 64169 65507 66867 68248 69652 71080 72530
CAPEX 280 0 23 23 23 23 23
271 0 21 20 19 19 18
Depreciation 3317 3336 3354 3372 3390 3408 3426
3217 3136 3057 2980 2905 2831 2760
FCF 13626 79573 111132 126541 139762 149725 152392
CEQ 0.970 0.940 0.911 0.884 0.857 0.831 0.805
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Volume 275536 288911 302940 318489 333082 349250 366210
Concession Revenues 11523 12082 12669 13285 13929 14606 15315
Other Revenues 1449 1520 1594 1671 1752 1837 1926
Revenue 288508 302513 317203 333445 348764 365693 383451
Certainty equivalent
revenues 225322 229071 232886 237362 240713 244718 248794
Fixed Costs 49454 51958 54588 57352 60255 63305 66510
Variable Costs 48748 51215 53808 56532 59394 62401 65560
Costs 98202 103173 108396 113884 119649 125706 132070
Costs wlo depreciation 94758 99711 104916 110386 116133 122172 128518
Costs 74005 75504 77028 78578 80154 81756 83386
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
18 17 17 16 16 15 15
Depreciation 3444 3462 3480 3498 3516 3534 3552
2690 2622 2555 2490 2427 2365 2305
FCF 153984 156166 158391 161252 162963 16504 167690
CEQ 0.781 0.757 0.734 0.712 0.690 0.669 0.649
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Volume
Concession Revenues
Other Revenues
Revenue
Certainty equivalent
revenues
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs
Costs
Costs wlo depreciation
Costs
CAPEX
Depreciation
FCF
CEQ
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
385006 402647 422192 442693 465415 486740 510367
16059 16839 17656 18514 19414 20355 21344
2020 2118 2221 2329 2442 2560 2685
403086 421604 442069 463536 487271 509656 534396
253575 257155 261433 265788 270896 274720 279291
69877 73415 77131 81036 85139 89449 93977
68879 72366 76030 79879 83922 88171 92635
138756 145781 153161 160915 169061 177620 186612
135186 142192 149554 157290 165418 173959 182933
85043 86729 88444 90189 91964 93769 95606
23 23 23 23 23 23 23
14 14 13 13 13 12 12
3571 3589 3607 3625 3643 3661 3679
2246 2189 2133 2078 2025 1973 1923
170.6275 17292 1750.59 17765 180535 18202 185585
0.629 0.610 0.591 0.573 0.556 0.539 0.523
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033
Volume 535151 562618 588397 616959 646918 680122 711285
Concession Revenues 22380 23468 24607 25802 27055 28369 29746
Other Revenues 2815 2952 3095 3245 3403 3568 3742
Revenue 560346 589038 616099 646006 677376 712060 744773
Certainty equivalent
revenues 283943 289400 293485 298368 303338 309168 313532
Fixed Costs 98735 103733 108985 114502 120299 126389 132787
Variable Costs 97324 102251 107428 112866 118580 124583 130890
Costs 196059 205985 216413 227369 238879 250972 263678
Costs wlo depreciation 192362 202269 212679 223617 235110 247185 259872
Costs 97475 99377 101312 103281 105285 107325 109400
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
11 11 11 10 10 10 10
Depreciation 3697 3715 3733 3751 3769 3788 3806
1873 1825 1778 1733 1688 1644 1602
FCF 188318 191826 193929 196797 199718 203465 205711
CEQ 0.507 0.491 0.476 0.462 0.448 0.434 0.421
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29 30 31 32 33 34 35
2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040
Volume 745812 782028 822167 859838 901576 945356 993878
Concession Revenues 31190 32705 34294 35958 37705 39536 41457
Other Revenues 3923 4114 4314 4523 4743 4973 5215
Revenue 780925 818847 860775 900320 944023 989865 1040550
Certainty equivalent
revenues 318748 324057 330286 334948 340521 346193 352846
Fixed Costs 139510 146572 153993 161789 169979 178584 187625
Variable Costs 137517 144479 151793 159477 167551 176033 184945
Costs 277026 291051 305785 321266 337530 354617 372570
Costs w/o depreciation 273203 287209 301926 317388 333634 350703 368638
Costs 111513 113663 115851 118078 120346 122654 125003
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
9 9 9 8 8 8 8
Depreciation 3824 3842 3860 3878 3896 3914 3932
1561 1520 1481 1443 1405 1369 1333
FCF 208774 211893 215893 218290 221558 224885 229153
CEQ 0.408 0.396 0.384 0.372 0.361 0.350 0.339
36 37 38 39 40 41 42
2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047
Volume 1039417 1089872 1142796 1201452 1256502 1317494 1381471
Concession Revenues 43468 45579 47793 50115 52547 55099 57774
Other Revenues 5468 5733 6012 6304 6610 6931 7267
Revenue 1088354 1141184 1196600 1257871 1315658 1379523 1446513
Certainty equivalent
revenues 357827 363781 369840 376948 382269 388629 395102
Fixed Costs 197124 207103 217588 228603 240176 252335 265109
Variable Costs 194308 204144 214479 225337 236745 248730 261322
Costs 391431 411247 432067 453940 476921 501065 526431
Costs w/o depreciation 387481 407279 428080 449936 472898 497024 522373
Costs 127395 129830 132309 134833 137402 140018 142681
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
7 7 7 7 7 6 6
Depreciation 3950 3968 3986 4004 4023 4041 4059
1299 1265 1232 1200 1169 1138 1109
FCF 231708 235193 238740 243292 246013 249727 253507
CEQ 0.329 0.319 0.309 0.300 0.291 0.282 0.273
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43 44 45 46 47 48 49
2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054
Volume 1452378 1518925 1592655 1669994 1755710 1836155 1925284
Concession Revenues 60582 63521 66606 69840 73235 76788 80517
Other Revenues 7620 7990 8378 8785 9212 9659 10128
Revenue 1520580 1590436 1667639 1748620 1838156 1922602 2015929
Certainty equivalent
revenues 402696 408380 415175 422090 430202 436275 443534
Fixed Costs 278530 292631 307446 323010 339362 356543 374593
Variable Costs 274551 288451 303053 318396 334514 351449 369241
Costs 553082 581082 610499 641406 673877 707992 743834
Costs wlo depreciation 549005 576987 606386 637274 669728 703824 739648
Costs 145393 148154 150966 153828 156743 159711 162733
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
6 6 6 5 5 5 5
Depreciation 4077 4095 4113 4131 4149 4167 4185
1080 1051 1024 997 971 946 921
FCF 258359 261255 265210 269236 24408 277487 281699
CEQ 0.265 0.257 0.249 0.241 0.234 0.227 0.220
50 51 52 53 54 55 56
2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061
Volume 2018776 2122393 2219640 2327384 2440402 2565659 2683216
Concession Revenues 84427 88530 92825 97333 102059 107020 112212
Other Revenues 10620 11136 11676 12243 12838 13462 14115
Revenue 2113823 2222059 2324142 2436960 2555299 2686140 2809543
Certainty equivalent
revenues 450921 459588 466075 473830 481722 490980 497911
Fixed Costs 393556 413480 434413 456405 479510 503785 529289
Variable Costs 387934 407573 428207 449885 472660 496588 521728
Costs 781490 821053 862619 906289 952170 1000374 1051018
Costs w/o depreciation 777287 816832 858380 902032 947894 996080 1046706
Costs 165811 168945 172136 175386 1781696 182066 185499
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
5 5 5 4 4 4 4
Delpreciation 4203 4221 4240 4258 4276 4294 4312
897 873 850 828 806 785 764
FCF 285984 291493 294766 29924 303809 309676 313154
CEQ 0.213 0.207 0.201 0.194 0.189 0.183 0.177
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Volume
Concession Revenues
Other Revenues
Revenue
Certainty equivalent
revenues
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs
Costs
Costs w/o depreciation
Costs
CAPEX
Depreciation
57 58 59 60 61 62 63
2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068
2813463 2950084 3101502 3243612 3401060 3566216 3749258
117661 123375 129371 135648 142235 149142 156390
14800 15519 16273 17063 17891 18760 19672
2945924 3088978 3247146 3396322 3561186 3734117 3925319
506195
556085
548141
1104225
1099895
188994
23
4
4330
744
514626 524517
584237 613813
575890 605045
1160127 1218858
1155779 1214492
192554 196179
23 23
4 4
4348 4366
724 705
531921 540771
644888 677535
635675 667856
1280563 1345391
1276179 1340989
199871 203631
23 23
4 3
4384 4402
687 668
549778 560345
711835 747872
701666 737188
1413502 1485060
1409082 1480622
207461 211361
23 23
3 3
4420 4438
651 634
FCF
CEQ
317923 3220.74 320.21 332714 337786 34246 349595
0.172 0.167 0.162 0.157 0.152 0.147 0.143
64 65 66 67 68 69 70
2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075
Volume 3921047 4111378 4311027 4532298 4739965 4970048 5211394
Concession Revenues 163978 171941 180290 189053 198225 207851 217944
Other Revenues 20626 21628 22678 23780 24934 26145 27414
Revenue 4105651 4304947 4513995 4745130 4963124 5204044 5456753
Certainty equivalent
revenues 568255 577709 587332 598620 607070 617170 627450
Fixed Costs 785733 825511 867302 911210 957340 1005805 1056724
Variable Costs 774508 813718 854912 898192 943663 991436 1041628
Costs 1560242 1639229 1722215 1809402 1901003 1997241 2098351
Costs wlo depreciation 1555785 1634754 1717722 1804891 1896474 1992694 2093786
Costs 215333 219:379 223499 227695 231969 236322 240756
CAPEX 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Depreciation 4456 4475 4493 4511 4529 4547 4565
617 600 585 569 554 539 525
FCF 353516 358909 364395 371471 375632 381365 387196
CEQ 0.138 0.134 0.130 0.126 0.122 0.119 0.115
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Volume
Concession Revenues
Other Revenues
Revenue
Certainty equivalent
revenues
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs
Costs
Costs wlo depreciation
Costs
CAPEX
Depreciation
FCF
CEQ
71 72 73 74 75 76
2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081
5478877 5729916 6008053 6299804 6623152 3282956
228537 239625 251261 263463 276267 0
28747 30142 31605 33140 34751 0
5736160 5999683 6290919 6596406 6934169 3282956
639509 64-536 659327 670309 683191 313613
1110220 1166425 1225476 1287515 1352696 0
1094360 1149762 1207969 1269122 1333372 0
2204580 2316187 2433444 2556637 2686067 0
2199997 2311586 2428825 2552000 2681412 (4673)
245272 249871 254556 259327 264187 (446)
23 23 23 23 23 23
3 2 2 2 2 2
4583 4601 4619 4637 4655 4673
511 497 484 471 459 446
30.94726 39140 405233 411430 419441 314483
0.111 0.108 0.105 0.102 0.099 0.096
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CHAPTER 4
THE LONG-TERM LEASE OF THE CHICAGO SKYWAY
In light of the ITR's analysis, I will evaluate the financial aspects of the Chicago
Skyway transaction based on following questions:
1. What was the financial performance of the toll road operations before
the long-term lease (Jan, 2005)? What measures did the City of
Chicago employ to measure the toll road performance? Was the asset
facing some serious financial setback at the time of transaction? If no,
then why did the City of Chicago still privatize the toll road?
2. What did the Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) assume about
the cost of capital for valuing the toll road operations? I will analyze
this question in light of the actual Macquarie financial model.
3. What did the earlier published studies assume about the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) of the concessionaire? Did they
make the correct assumptions?
In light of above questions, I have organized the chapter as follows:
Section 1 describes the toll road operations before the lease in detail. It discusses
whether the Chicago Skyway toll road operations were facing some serious
financial setback before the lease. It explains the ownership structure up to the lease
period. Section 2 gives details about the toll road's performance in the post-lease
period. Section 3 critically evaluates some of the oft-cited earlier analyses of the
Chicago Skyway valuation. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
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4.1. Section 1: Description of the toll road
The Chicago Skyway is a 7.8 mile, six-lane divided toll bridge facility. It links
Interstate Route 90 from the Illinois-Indiana state line near 106t h Street, over the
Calumet River, and into the junction with the Dan Ryan Expressway (Interstate Route
94) near 63 rd Street. Like the ITR, the Skyway features a barrier system of toll
collection. According to the CAFR report (2004), there are eight active toll collection
lanes in each direction. The construction of the Skyway was financed with the proceeds
of bonds. It commenced its toll road operations in 1958. The Skyway road configuration
is :
Figure 25: Chicago Skyway road configuration
StartVlEnd
EIi
Source: The MIG's presentation to investors, 2005, p. 6
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4.1.1 Key statistics before the lease
In light of the financial statements and the MIG's presentations to the investors
(2005 and 2006), this section discusses the vehicle traffic (volume), the seasonality of
the traffic, etc. Based on the ten-year period (1995-2004), the vehicle traffic in volume
was experiencing an increase.
Table 18: Vehicle Traffic (in millions)
I 3-Axles or More I Total Vehicles
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Ub2U
10625
13075
13947
14537
14821
16908
17106
16046
1 642
10%
23%
7%
4%
2%
14%
1%
-6%
-3%
1099
1187
1628
1703
1782
1695
1809
1605
1376
1753
t1o0
8%
37%
5%
5%
-5%
7%
-11%
-14%
27%
11812
14703
15650
16319
16516
18717
18711
17422
17396
l70
10%
24%
6%
4%
1%
13%
0%
-7%
0%
Annual Annual Percent Change
1995-2004 .5% I 5.3% 55%
1999-2004 1.5 -0.3 1.3
Source: The Chicago Skyway Financial statements, 1994 - 2005.
According to the 2002/2003 statistics, the nature of the traffic is seasonal. There
is relatively strong traffic on weekends (see MIG's presentation to investors, 2004).
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Figure 26: The seasonal nature of traffic (Chicago Skyway)
1 t'yli
I z(Y
40~s
Source: The MIG's Presentation to investors, 2005
Over the years, it appears that the traffic is stronger during the second half of the
calendar year. Seasonally, the traffic peak occurs in July/August.
Table 19: Chicago Skyway - Toll revenues upto the lease period (2005)
Year 2-Axles
Percent
Change From
Prior Year
3-Axles or
More
Percent
Change From
Prior Year
Gross
Revenues
Commercial
Discount
Total
Vehicles
Revenues
Percent
Change
From Prior
Year
Revenues in Thousands- Unaudited
1995 18843 7% 6615 7% 25458 62 25396 7%
1996 20812 10% 7154 8% 27966 62 27904 10%
1997 25597 23% 9810 37% 35407 76 35331 27%
1998 27284 7% 10293 5% 37577 87 37490 6%
1999 29192 7% 10115 -2% 39307 93 39214 5%
2000 29641 2% 9619 -5% 39260 84 39176 0%
2001 33817 14% 10228 6% 44045 81 43964 12%
2002 34212 1% 9051 -12% 43263 76 43187 -2%
2003 32093 -6% 7694 -15% 39787 71 39716 -8%
2004 31284 -3% 9947 29% 41231 91 41140 4%
Annual Annual Percent Change
1995-2004 5.8% 4.6% 5.5%
1999-2004 1.4 -0.3 1.3
Source: The Chicago Skyway financial statements from 1994 to 2005.
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If we measure the toll road performance by the total gross revenues over the ten
year period, 1995-2004, then it becomes evident that revenue wise and volume wise, the
toll road operations were not experiencing any significant decline. As shown in above
table, for '3-Axles or more category', the volume experienced an increase of 29percent,
the total vehicles revenues also experienced 4percent increase.
Why is it important to establish that the toll road operations of Chicago Skyway
were not experiencing any serious financial setback? It is because some of the oft-
quoted studies justify the sale of the toll roads on financial grounds. Such studies claim
that the City of Chicago sold the toll road because it did not have sufficient funds to
keep up the financial health of the toll road or make capital improvements.
4.2. Financial condition of the Chicago Skyway upto Jan 2005
One way to measure the extent of capital improvements made over the years is
to analyze the previous financial performance of the toll road operations. Such
information is available in the financial statements of the toll road. For the Chicago
Skyway, the statements include statement of net assets. The other statements include the
statement of revenues, expenses, and changes in net assets (in private corporation, such
statement will be called the profit and loss (P&L) statement) and the statement of cash
flows.
4.2.1. Statement of Revenues, Expenses and Changes in Net Assets
Such statement reflects what revenues were generated and what expenses were
incurred to generate those revenues. The excess of revenues over expenses, formerly
known as the net income is reflected as a transfer to assets. According to the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) for June 30, 2003, the change in the
assets held is an indicator of whether the toll road's financial health is improving or
deteriorating (the Chicago Skyway financial statements, p. 2, 2006).
109
Table 20: The consolidated financial summary - Chicago Skyway (1995-2004)
The Chicago Skyway- Summary of financial position
(In thousands dollars
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Toll revenues 25,396 27,904 35,331 37,490 39,214 39,176 43,964 43,187 39,716 41,140
Concession and other 34 39 47 42 38 38 40 45 54 51
revenues
Interest expense 3,277 2,396 2,562 3,300 3,408 3,994 3,745 1,811 1,620 (261)
Total revenues 28,707 30,338 37,940 40,832 42,660 43,208 47,749 45,043 41,390 40,930
Total Operating 6,292 6,662 7,222 7,361 8,152 7,896 9,106 10,050 11,417 12,213
Expenses
Operating reserve 1,400
deposit (2)
Net Profit 22,415 22,376 30,718 33,471 34,508 35,312 38,643 34,993 29,973 28,717
Debt service coverage requirenent greater of
Annual debt service requirement 8585 8903 10223 17466 17387 17532 20497
Debt service coverage requirement greater of 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
120% of annual debt service requirement 10302 10684 12268 20959 20864 21038 24596
Debt service account 8585 8903 10223 17466 17387 17532 20497
Capital lmprovement account 6682 61589
Total 8585 8903 10223 17466 17387 24214 82086
Debt service coverage 3.9 19 3.5 22 2.0 1.2 0.3
Source: The Chicago Skyway financial statements, 1995-2004
The above financial summary shows that over the period 1995 to 2004, the toll
revenues increased, but however because of the high interest expense, the net profit
declined. The total operating expenses constituted 29 percent of total revenues in 2004
versus 24 percent of total revenues in 1995. Because of the capital improvements and
debt service requirements, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) fell from the
benchmark ratio of 1.2 to 0.3 in 2004.
According to the CAFR (2004), the City of Chicago had covenanted to maintain
tolls at such levels as would produce the toll road operations sufficient in revenues each
fiscal year to provide an amount of net revenues in each fiscal year (i) 120 percent of the
annual debt service requirement for such fiscal year on account of all bonds then
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outstanding or (ii) 100 percent of the sum in such fiscal year of certain fund deposit
requirements (see Chicago Skyway financial statements 2003-04).
4.2.2. The Statement of Net Assets
The statement of net assets (deficit) presents all the assets and liabilities using the
accrual basis of accounting. The difference between assets and liabilities is reported as
net assets. Up to the lease, the City's management used the increase or decrease in net
assets as an indicator for judging the Skyway's financial position. The total net assets
(deficit) had been increasing till 2004. The Skyway's current ratio (current
assets/current liabilities) at December 21, 2004 was 0.80:1. Total net deficit of $134.54
million increased by $89.5million (198.8 percent) as a result of current loss before
operating transfers out and capital grants of $1.26 million.
Table 21: Summary of the Skyway's Net Assets
Summary of the Skyway's Net assets
In million dollars
Years 2002 2003 2004
Total assets 419 422 410
Total Liabilities 470 467 544
Invested in capital assets-net
of related debt 61 61 70
Restricted net assets 22 32 35
Unrestricted net deficit -134 -137 -239
Total net assets (deficit) r -51 -45 -135
Source: The Chicago Skyway financial statements, 2002-2004
In the above table, the net assets (deficit) refers to difference between total assets
and total liabilities.
111
Table 22: Change in Net Deficit
Change in Net Deficit
In million dollars
Years 2002 2003 2004
Toll revenue&concession
revenues 43 40 41
Interest expense 16 18 21
Operating income 27 21 20
Nonoperating expenses 19 19 21
Operating transfers out -23 -96
(Decrease)/Increase in net
assets -11 6 -89
Skyway's Operating Expenses
In million dollars
Years 2002 2003 2004
Administration 3 3 4
Operations 5 6 6
Maintenance 3 3 3
Depreciation and amortization 6 7 9
Total operating expenses 16 18 21
Chicago Skyway - Statement of Cash Flows
In million dollars
Years 2002 2003 2004
Cash flows from operating
activities 34 28 29
Cash flows from (used in )
noncapital and related
financing activities -15 -8 4
Cash flows used in capital
and related financing -60 -149 -121
Cash flows from investing
activities 78 67 53
37 -63 -35
Cash and cash equivalents -
Beginning of the year 87 124 60
Cash and cash equivalents -
End of year 124 60 25
Source: Chicago Skyway financial statements, 2002-2004
In 2004, the operating transfers out of $96 million were related to the Skyway
lease transaction and were comprised of $34 million transferred to the Vehicle Tax Fund
and $62 million to the Corporate Fund. The toll road's operating expenses did not
experience much change from 2002 till 2004.
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The administration expenses increased in 2004 by $ 0.71 million (23.9 percent)
due to costs related to the long-term concession and lease of the Skyway. The increase
in operations expenses of $0.23 million (4.1 percent) was due to increased insurance
costs of $0.08 million, increased workers' compensation costs of $0.10 million and
increased indirect expenses of $0.08 million. In 2004, the maintenance expenses
decreased by 4.7percent due to decreased fleet maintenance and personnel costs.
Depreciation and amortization expenses increased $1.62 million (23 percent) as a result
of the capital activities of the Skyway's Capital Improvement Program.
4.2.3. Statement of Cash Flow
Such statement reflects the cash provided to the toll road project from its
activities; operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities. The cash and
cash equivalents category at the end of the year represents the ability of the toll road
district to weather difficult economic times and to fund needed projects in future years.
The above table shows that the City of Chicago made capital and related financing
investing decisions worth $121 million in 2004 hence the net cash flow experienced
major decline.
4.3. Was the City Management making the capital investments?
Up to the lease period 2005, the Skyway's capital activities were funded through
Skyway revenue bonds, federal and state grants, and Skyway revenue. According to the
notes to financial statements, during 2003, the Skyway expended $138.6 million on
capital activities. Those capital activities were for construction projects, including the
75 th to 79 th street viaduct rehabilitation project and structural steel rehabilitation of
Commercial avenue, Calumet River Bridge and 100 th Street viaducts and reconstruction
of eastbound traffic lanes from Commercial avenue to the Indiana border; and
realignment of the Indianapolis Boulevard entrance and exit ramps. During 2004, the
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Skyway expended $83.2 million on capital activities. These capital activities included
construction projects, principally the reconstruction of the westbound traffic lanes from
Commercial Avenue to the Indiana border and construction of the 92 n d Street entrance
and exit ramps.
4.4. Ownership Structure upto 2005
According to the CAFR (2004), the City of Chicago was responsible for the
management, maintenance, and operation of the Skyway since its opening. The Skyway
had been accounted for as a separate enterprise fund of the City. According to the CAFR
2004, no major changes either in the population or the industrial base of the area were
expected that would lead to a significant change in revenues.
4.5. Section II: The toll-road operation in the post-period lease
According to the financial accounts, the Skyway Concession Company (SCC)
allocated the $1.83 billion paid to the City of Chicago and $17 million of other direct
costs associated with entering into the Concession and Lease Agreement to the
following assets based upon their relative fair values. The company used an outside
independent appraiser to help determine the fair values of the various assets associated
with the Concession and Lease Agreement. According to the 2004 financial accounts, a
portion of this payment ($446 million) was used to advance refund all of the outstanding
Skyways bonds.
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The breakdown of the bid price
Concession rights 1,513,272
Source: The Chicago Skyway financial statements, 2005-2006
4.5.1. Ownership Structure in the post-lease period
In January 2005, the City of Chicago completed a long-term concession and lease
of the Skyway. The concession agreement granted the private company the ability to
operate the Skyway and to collect toll revenue from the Skyway during the 99-year term
of the agreement. According to the December 31, 2005 financial statements, the Skyway
Concession Company Holdings, LLC (the "Company") is a limited liability company. It
is a Pass through entity for the federal and state income tax purposes. The Company is
indirectly owned 55 percent by Cintra and 45percent by MIG and Macquarie
Infrastructure Partners (MIP).
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Bridges and Roads 322,510
Buildings 1,003
Leasehold interest on land 8,618
Furniture, fixtures and office
666
equipment
Computer, and office equipment 1,110
Total 1,847,179
Figure 27: SCC - Organization Table
Source: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary (A Delaware Limited Liability
Company) Financial Accounts, 2005 and 2006.
4.5.2 Financing Structure and Capital Structure
According to the Macquarie Bank Limited, the total funding requirement for the
Chicago Skyway is US $ 1.882 billion. The sources and uses are given below:
Sources for the Chicago Skyway's concession money
Bank Debt 1000
MIG Equity 397 21
Cintra Equity 485 26
Total 1882 100
Source: The MIG Chicago Skyway Presentation, 2005
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Users of the Chicago Skyway's concession money
Purchase Price 1830
Transactions and Debt
52 3
Costs
Total 1882 100
Source: The MIG Chicago Skyway Presentation, 2005
Details about the Chicago Skyway's financing facility
Acquisition Debt 1000
Capex Facility 110
Liquidity Facility 80
Total 1190
Source: The MIG Chicago Skyway, Presentation, 2005
The above three facilities constitute about $1.19 billion. The amount $1.00
billion was drawn on acquisition. The maturity of the debt is 9 years and the margin is
1.25percent from years 1 to 5.
4.5.2.1. The Chicago Skyway's toll-setting mechanism:
The logic behind the Chicago Skyway's toll-setting regulations was that tolls,
prior to the concessions, had been kept artificially low. As explained before, the City of
Chicago was unable to meet the required DSCR. According to the concession
agreement, the tolls were adjusted by two factors:
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c) Inflation (consumer price index (CPI))
d) Or the ability to pay (gross domestic product (GDP)).
The details of the toll adjustment schedule are explained below:
a) Before the lease, the toll was $2.00 for passenger vehicles. It was
$1.20/axle for heavy vehicles. These tolls had not changed since 1993.
a) For passenger vehicles, the toll will be $2.50 after 2 Feb 2005.
b) Maximum tolls are raised on each of 1 Jan 2008, 2011, 2013, 2015 and
2017 by the greater of: $0.50; and CPI.
c) Greater of 2percent, CPI or nominal GDP/capita post-2017
Figure 28: Toll-setting mechanism (Chicago Skyway)
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Source: Tolling Schedule, the Chicago Skyway Concession Agreement, 2005-2006
4.5.2.2. How the traffic has evolved in 2008?
Given that the Chicago Skyway concession agreement is ending in 2081,
the MIG announces the traffic results every year. According to the MIG's presentation
to investors, the Skyway traffic was negatively impacted during the June 2008 quarter
by weakening surrounding national and regional economic conditions and fuel prices in
Chicago.
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Table 23: How the traffic has evolved in 2008?
Skyway Concession Company LLC - Skyway
AprJune 2008Api-June Apr-June 2 change on2007 2008
Category
Average daily revenue
Revenues (US$) 151,862 165351 8.90%
Average daily traffic
Workdays 51013 43702 -14.3%
Weekends/Public Holidays 53316 45372 -14.9%
All days 51747 44198 -14.6%
Non-cash transactions 39% 50% 10.0%
Source: The MIG's presentation to investors, 2008.
4.6. Accounting in the post-lease period
The Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary publish three
financial statements to evaluate the toll road performance. These statements include the
balance sheet (BS), the profit and loss (P&L) statement, and the cash flow (CF)
statements. A snapshot of the three financial statements is given below: because of the
high interest expense, the P&L statement shows considerable decrease in net profit.
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Table 24: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary
Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary
A Delaware Limited Liability Company - In million dollars
Years 2006 2007 2008
Net property and equipment 361 378 375
Concession rights, net of 1484 1469 1453
amortization
Others assets 44 19 25
Current and non-currents 1888 1866 1853
assets
Deferred financing costs, 47 41 37prepaid expenses and others
Cash reserve accounts 82 58 55
Total assets 2017 1964 1945
Current and derivative liability 90 230 711
Long-term debt 1569 1550 1553
Total liabilities 1649 1780 2264
Members' equity 508 486 478
Accumulated other 0 -77 -428
comprehensive income (loss)
Accumulated deficit at the end -141 -225 -368
of the period
Total liabilities and 2017 1964 1945
members' equity I
Source: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary 2006-2008
Table 25: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary Net Loss
Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary
A Delaware Limited Liability Company
In million dollars
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008
Toll, concession and other 50 56 53 62
revenues
Operating expenses-toll 11 11 11 11
collection operation
Depreciation and amortization 21 23 24 22
Operating expenses 32 34 35 32
Operating income 18 22 18 30
Derivative loss -25 -26 -7 -76
Interest expense net -89 -38 -95 -97
Net loss -95 -42 -84 -143
Source: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary 2006-2008
As evident from above, it will take some time before the toll road
operations start making profits because of high interest expenses.
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Table 26: Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary Cash flow
Statement
Skyway Concession Company Holdings, LLC and Subsidiary
A Delaware Limited Liability Company
In million dollars
Years 2006 2007 2008
Cash flow from operating
activities
Net loss -42 -84 -143
Net cash flows used in
operating activities -26 -46 -44
Net cash flows from investing
activities -25 22 -7
Net cash flow from financing
activities 52 24 51
Net change in cash 1 0 0
Cash
Beginning of year 0 1 0
End of year 1 0 0
Because of high net loss, the
significant change in cash.
cash flow position did not experience any
4.7. Valuation of the Chicago Skyway
In the next chapter, I will discuss how MIG calculated the value of the Chicago
Skyway. I also give details about the assumptions that MIG made about the cost of
capital.
4.8. Summary
From above analysis, it appears that the Chicago Skyway toll road operations
were experiencing some problem in meeting the debt service requirements. However,
the City of Chicago was making capital improvements before the lease took place in
2005.
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CHAPTER 5
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO VALUE THE CHICAGO
SKYWAY
In Chapter 03, I discussed the methodology employed by the Macquarie
Infrastructure Group (MIG), the concessionaire to calculate the Chicago Skyway's
value. Like the ITR's analysis, there are two key drivers for the discounted cash flow
(DCF) analysis.
c) The Chicago Skyway's toll elasticity of demand.
d) The cost of capital.
If we are employing the discounted cash flow (DCF) as the valuation technique
to determine the Chicago Skyway's value, then an interesting question is how does the
toll road's value changes under various scenarios? Such analysis offers a unique
perspective of rethinking the way the City of Chicago could finance its infrastructure
assets.
5.1. How can we calculate the cost of capital for the Chicago
Skyway?
For my thesis, I define the value of the Chicago Skyway as the financial value of
the toll road. To calculate the toll road's value, firstly I employ the net present value
method (NPV). I use the same cash flow (CF) stream as in the Macquarie financial
model. Like the ITR's valuation, I will also determine the Chicago Skyway's value
under different approaches. The value of the cost of capital changes under each
approach. I will discuss the approaches in the later section.
As Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2008) explain in chapter 07 "Introduction to Risk,
Return, and the Opportunity Cost of Capital", the steps involved in calculating the
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opportunity cost of capital; the rate of return the MIG would have gotten if it would have
invested $1.88 billion in some other project of the same risk. It is the sum of the risk-free
rate ( r.r ) and a premium of risk ( r, - rf ) so for the Chicago Skyway, the opportunity
cost of capital would be r',, (2005) = r f (2005) + beta * market risk premium ( rm - rf ).
According to the Brattle Group Incorporation, the beta of a toll road (an
infrastructure asset) is 0.42. I calculate the opportunity cost of capital by using the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM). The equation is given by
Cost of capital = risk free rate in 2005 ( rf ) + beta * (market risk premium)
Cost of capital = 4.14 percent+0.42 * (7.6 percent) = 7.33 percent
Where the risk free rate is = 4.14 percent, fl = 0.42 (the Brattle Group, Inc
2009) and the market risk premium is given by 7.6 percent. I assumed the values of such
variables at the time of the transaction in 2005. While calculating the above formula, the
critical assumption is that there is a normal, stable risk premium on the market portfolio
hence the expected future risk premium can be measured by the average past risk
premium.
Using the DCF analysis, I analyze the following scenarios:
e) Scenario 1: The value of the Chicago Skyway if the City of Chicago
continued to operate and maintain the toll road.
f) Scenario 2: How the value of the toll road changed when the City of
Chicago leased the asset to Macquarie investment group. Note that
federal and state taxes are triggered, but partly shielded by interest on the
$ 1.0 billion of debt financing. I use Monte Carlo simulation to calculate
the value of taxes paid after interest tax shields.
g) Scenario 3: How much value could the City of Chicago have achieved
by retaining the Chicago Skyway and utilizing its debt capacity by
issuing tax-exempt debt?
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h) Scenarios 4 and 5: What toll increases or operating cost savings would
be necessary to justify the privatization?
5.1.1 Assumptions: Macquarie Financial Model
The financial model relies on assumptions about revenues and car and heavy
vehicle traffic. The assumptions are about the traffic growth (2 percent), traffic mix
(cars/vehicles) and heavy vehicles day/night mix (70 percent to 30 percent). Within the
total expenditures category, the administration expenses account for 16percent and the
operations and maintenance expenses 46 percent. Before actually proceeding to
calculating the value of the Chicago Skyway, I present my approach of calculating the
toll road value in form of a conceptual diagram.
Figure 29: Various Approaches to value the Chicago Skyway
Pretax - The City of Chicago I
The City of Chicago finances the
purchase by the tax-exempt debt.
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5.2. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
In a presentation to the investors, the MIG management 2005 claimed that under
its operations, the toll road had started operating more efficiently i.e. at decreased
operating expenses and higher toll revenues. As highlighted in Geltner and
Moavenzadeh's (1987) paper, the private operator's efficiency can be defined as
a) The private operator can reduce the operating expenditures
b) And the private operator can raise the toll revenues.
The MIG's Management also defined efficiency in above two ways. However, in
2007, they reported that 2007 overhead was 11 percent below budget. However, the
2007 toll revenues for the Chicago Skyway were 5 percent below those of 2006 due to a
decrease in heavy vehicles' traffic, despite a slight increase of light traffic.
The sections below show how the value of the toll road changes under various scenarios.
5.2.1. The value of the toll road to City of Chicago
Using 7.33 percent as the opportunity of cost of capital, the value of the toll road
comes out to be $2.055 billion. This is the value of the toll road to City of Chicago.
125
Table 27: Chicago Skyway - NPV to the City of Chicago
Revenues 686 1696 3148 5732 6619 17,881
Operating 274 678 1259 2293 2648 7,152
Expenditures
Operating Profit 516 1276 2367 4311 4978 13,446
Capex 0 0 0 0 0 1
Depreciation 104 258 478 871 1006 2,718
FCF 620 1533 2845 5182 5984 16,163
Revenues 686 1696 3148 5732 6619 17,881
NPV @ 7.3 percent = $ 2.055 billion.
5.2.2. Normal Net Present Value (NPV) - The after-tax WACC
Under such scenario, I calculate the after-tax weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) which is defined as
After-tax WACC = rd *(1 D ETc) e *V V
According to the MM's second proposition, the cost of equity comes out to be 6.90
percent.
D
re = ra +(ra - rd ) * E
1.00
r
, 
= 7.33 + (7.33 - 6.02) * 1.00 = 8.80%0.88
After-tax WACC=6.02*(1-0.40)*0.53+8.80*0.47 =6.09 percent
The after-tax cost of debt captures the interest tax shields. The cost of debt (rd)
is the market interest rate on its existing debt and on any new borrowing at the time of the
sale. The cost of equity (re ) is the expected rate of return demanded by investors for
Chicago Skyway. The above formula assumes that the concessionaire, the MIG is
constantly rebalancing its debt. Under such scenario, I will calculate the Chicago
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Skyway's value using the after-tax WACC. The toll road value is $2494.9 million. This
value is inclusive of interest tax shields.
Table 28: After-tax value of the ITR to the concessionaire
Revenues 686 1696 3148 5732 6619 17881
Operating
Expenditures 274 678 1259 2293 2648 7152
Operating Profit 516 1276 2367 4311 4978 13446
Capex 0 0 0 0 0 1
Taxes 164 405 751 1367 1579 4265
Depreciation 104 258 478 871 1006 2718
FCF 456 1129 2094 3815 4405 11899
NPV @ 6 percent = $ 1.995 billion
For the after-tax value, I discount the above-cash flows at the after-tax WACC
which appears to be a dangerous assumption as explained above. For such scenario, the
after-tax WACC calculated above no longer is the correct approach to calculate the cost
of capital of the toll road.
5.2.3. Adjusted Present value (APV)
It is because certain assumptions do not hold hence the after-tax WACC
fails to give an accurate estimate for the Chicago Skyway, it does not have the same risk
or capital structure as the MIG has. For such scenario, Brealey, Myers and Allen (2009)
recommend that the adjusted present value (APV) is the correct approach of computing
net present value (NPV), rather than after-tax WACC. Under the standard normal APV
procedure, firstly we move towards simpler adjusted present value (APV). Unlike the
WACC calculation, which assumed that the debt will be maintained at a constant ratio to
value, we do not have to keep debt at a constant proportion of value. The value of the
Chicago Skyway project is calculated as below:
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Value of the Chicago Skyway project = After-tax value of all equity-financed project +
the present value (PV) of tax shields.
I have assumed the cost of debt as rd = 6.02 percent. It is the yield on the
Baa corporate utility bond yield at the time the transaction took place (2005). I assume
that the PV of all-equity financed project is represented by the PV (2). The PV (2) refers
to the value of all equity-financed project. Then, the above equation becomes
APV = PV (2) + the present value of taxes saved by deducting rdD, at rd = 6.02
percent. The PV (2) = $1513 million, the value of an all-equity financed project being
discounted at the opportunity cost of capital while the present value of tax shields is
$359.3million. The value of the asset comes out to be $ 1872.3 million. As the taxes are
triggered, despite the increases in the toll rates and the traffic volumes, the value of the
toll road goes down by $0.18 billion.
5.2.4. Adjusted Present value (APV) with tax loss carry forwards (TLCFs)
Under above scenario, the Chicago Skyway value is $1911 million. The interest
tax shields are worth $398.9 million. The calculations are explained later in
Appendix 5.2.
5.2.5. When the City of Chicago finances the purchase of toll road with the
tax-exempt debt
Under such scenario, I want to calculate by how much value could the city of
Chicago have achieved by retaining the Chicago Skyway and fully utilizing its debt
capacity by issuing tax-exempt debt? I use 5.33 percent as the tax-exempt rate. The 5.33
percent is the interest rate for BBB tax-exempt bonds. The maturity of such bonds is 20
years. I am using this rate since the term of the concession is 99 years, hence I am using
the bond rate with a long maturity. The below NPV calculation explains how much this
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opportunity is worth. As explained in table below, the opportunity is worth $443.2
million. Borrowing at 5.33 percent is a good deal when the market debt rate is 6.02
percent. In case, I use 7.33 percent as the market risk premium then the worth of such
opportunity comes out to be $ 718 million.
5.2.6. When the operator becomes more efficient by lowering operating
expenditures or increasing the toll revenues
As explained in Appendix 1, in order to be efficient, the private operator needs
to increase the tolls by 16 percent or reduce the operating expenditures by 39 percent.
5.2.7. Monte Carlo Simulation
One way to investigate the project financing of Chicago Skyway is by using the
Monte Carlo Simulation. Due to the path-dependent nature of such particular
investment, and the complication of some underlying variables, it is useful to use
simulation in order to generate a probability distribution of possible outcomes. When I
use the Monte Carlo Simulation (5000 trials), I find that in order to be efficient the
private operator has to reduce the operating expenditures by 20.5 percent or has to
increase the tolls by 10 percent.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 5.1
($ Million)
Table 29: Comparison of various scenarios - Chicago Skyway
Value of the toll road
Weighted average
cost of capital
(WACC)
The value of the Chicago
In the absence of Taxes Skway to the IFA (the public 2,055.4 7.33%
entity)
Normal NPV - After-tax WACC 1,955.1 6.09%
When the taxes are triggered. Normal APV 1 872.3
Cost of equity - 7.33%,Normal APV with TLCFs 1,912.0 C
the cost of debt=6.02%
If the City of Chicago finances The cost of debt is the
the tollroad via tax-exempt 2,262.0 tax-exempt debt worthdebt.The value of the toll road is 5.33 percent.
reduced to
In the case, the private operator By APV (TLCFs)- ( The
can be more efficient by operating expenditures areCost of equity - 7.33%,
reducing the operating reduced by 26 percent) the cost of debt=6.02%
expenditure
By APV (TLCFs)- ( The privateIn the case, the private operator Cost of equity - 7.33%,
can charge higher tolls. operatthe cost of debt=6.02%by 11 percent)
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Appendix 5.2
The calculation of the interest tax shields by taking into account the tax loss carry
forwards (TLCFs)
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Total Revenues
Total Operating Expenditures
Total Operating Expenditures(w/o Dep)
Operating Profit
Tax(40%)-
In case of an allequity-f ed fim
Interest
Net Income [Op erating Inc ome-Interest]
Tax
Tax that is actually being paid
Tax Loss Cany forward
Interest tax shield
Interest tax shield/Interest
TotalRevenues
Total Op eratingExpenditures
Total Operating Expenditures(wlo Dep)
Operating Profit
Tax (40%) -
In case ofan al-equity-finmced fim
Interest
NetIncome [OperatingIncome-Interest .
Tax
TaxLoss Cany forward
Interest tax shield
Interest tax shield/Intere st
23148 49359 53949 53468 69833 71230 72655 89991 91791 110212
9259 19744 21580 21387 27933 28492 29062 35996 36716 44085
5741 12241 13379 13260 17319 17665 18018 22318 22764 27333
17407 37118 40569 40208 52515 53565 54636 67673 69027 82880
6911 14736 16106
15963 20848 21265 21691 26866 27404 32903
63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 6 8 63308 63308 63308
-45901 -26190 -22739 -23100 -10793 -9743 -8672 4365 5719 19572
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-45901 -72091 -94829 -117929 -128723 -138465 -147137 -142772 -137053 -117482
6911 14736 16106 15963 20848 21265 21691 26866 27404 32903
11% 23% 25% 25% 33% 34% 34% 42% 43% 52%
2014 2M 2016 201 218 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
112416 131857 134494 155137 166555 176539 187019 197847 211217 2230864
44967 52743 53798 62055 66622 70616 74808 79139 84487 89225
27879 32701 33355 38474 41306 43782 46381 49066 52382 55320
84537 99156 101140 116663 125249 132757 140638 148781 158836 167744
33561 39365 40152 46315 49724 52705 55833 59066 63058 66594
63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308
21229 35848 37832 53355 61941 69449 77330 85473 95528 104436
21342 24591 27571 30700 33933 37924 41461
12220 24591 27571 30700 33933 37924 41461
-96253 -60404 -22573
33561 39365 40152 34095 25133 25133 25133 25133 25133 25133
53% 62% 63% 54% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40%
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2004 2005 2006 2007 208 2005 2010 201 2012 2013
TotalRevenues
Total Operating Expenditu es
TotalOperating xpenditures(wfoDep)
OperatingProfit
Tax (40%)-
Incaseofauall-equity- ced fim
Interest
Net lIncome [OperatingIncome-Interest]
Tax
Tax that is actuillheig paid,
Ta Loss Cary forward
Interest ta shield
Interest tax shield/Interest
b
TotalRevenues
TotalOperatingxpenditures
Totalperating Expenditures(wo Dep.)
Operating Profit
Tax (40%)-
hncase ofaxalequity-aimcelfim
Interest
Net Income OperatingIncome-Interest]
Tax
Tax that is actuaUyleitg paid
TaxLoss Canyforward
Interest tax shield
Interest tax shield/Interest
237823 250767 266497 283211 300487 318620 339916 359819 383045 407357
95129 100307 106599 113284 120195 127448 135966 143928 153218 162943
58980 62190 66091 70236 74521 79018 84299 89235 94995 101025
178843 188577 200406 212975 225966 239602 255617 270584 288050 306333
71001 74865 79561 84551 89709 95122 101480 107422 114356 121614
63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308 63308
115535 125269 137098 149667 162658 176294 192309 207276 224742 243025
45867 49732 54428 59418 64575 69989 76346 82289 89222 96481
45867 49732 54428 59418 64575 69989 76346 82289 89222 96481
25133 25133 25133 25133 25133
133 2 5133 25133 25133 25133
40% 40% 40% 40% 40%
25133
25133
40%
25133 25133 25133 25133
25133 25133 25133 25133
40% 40% 40% 40%
2034 2135 203 20317 2038 20 9 2040 2041 2042 2043
430027 459091 486807 515449 548606 583222 615989 656796 695996 740290
172011 183636 194723 206180 219442 233289 246395 262718 278399 296116
106647 113854 120728 127831 136054 144639 152765 162885 172607 183592
323381 345236 368079 387618 412551 438583 463223 493910 523389 556698
128382 137059 145333
63308 63308 63308
260073 281928 302771
103249 111925 120200
103249 111925 120200
25133 25133 25133
25133 25133 25133
40% 40% 40%
153884 163783 174117 183900 196082 207786 221009
63308 63308 63308 63308 36122 57418 51462
324310 349243 375275 399915 457789 485971 505236
128751 138650 148984 158766 181742 184990 200579
128751 138650 148984 158766 181742 184990 200579
25133 25133 25133
25133 25133 25133
40% 40% 40%
25133
25133
40%
14340 22795 20430
14340 22795 20430
40% 40% 40%
133
i --- P
2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050
Total Revenues 783226 834852 885109 937718 996260 1057347 1124831
Total Operating Expenditures 313290 333941 354044 375087 398504 422939 449932
Total Operating Exp enditure s(w/o Dep.) 194240 207043 219507 232554 247072 262222 278958
Operating Profit 588986 627809 665602 705164 749187 795125 845873
Tax (40%) -
In case ofan all-equity-fnanced firm 233827 249240 264244 279950 297427 315665 335811
Interest 45181 38557 31572 24206 16439 8249 914
Net Income [Operating Income-Interest] 543805 589252 634030 680958 732748 786877 844958
Tax 215891 233933 251710 270340 290901 312390 335449
Tax that is actually being paid 215891 233933 251710 270340 290901 312390 335449
Tax Loss Cany forward
Interest tax shield 17937 15307 12534 9610 6526 3275 363
17937 15307 12534 9610 6526 3275 363
Interest tax shield/Interest 40% 12% 9% 7% 4% 2% 1%
Present value of the interest tax shield @
6.02% 398986
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Appendix 5.3
Under simple adjusted present value (APV), the calculation of interest tax shields
InThousands 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201* 2011 2012 2013
Debt 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000
Interest 80200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 660200 60200
Interest tax shield 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899
2014 2015 2016 207 2018 2010 2020 2021 2022 2023
Debt 1000000 1000000 1000000 100000 1000000 100000000000 io  0 00 0 1 00 1000000 1000000 1000000
Interest 60200 60200 60200 N0200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200
Interest tax shield 23899 23899 23899 2 899 39 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899 23899
2024 2025 2026 202T 2028 229 2030 2031 2032 2033
Debt 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000
Interest 60200 60200 60200 60200 6020 02 6 00 60200 60200 60200 60200
Interest tax shield 23899 23899 23899 23823899 2389999 23899 23899
2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 239 2040 2 2042 $43
Debt 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 75197 79851 84793
Interest 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 60200 58148 53494 48552
Interest tax shiel23899 23 23899 899 23899 23899 23085 21237 19275 17192 14979
2044 24 2w 2t47 204 204 2050
Debt 90041 95614 101531 107815 114487 121573 129097
Interest 43304 37731 31814 25530 18858 11772 4248
Interest tax sield 12630 10136 7487 4674 1687 0 0
Present value of the interest tax shield @
6.02% 359.343
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The amortization schedule is calculated for the last ten years (2044-2050)
Year Interest Principal Balance
1 $58,148 $75,197 $924,803
2 $53,494 $79,851 $844.951
3 $48,552 $84,793 $760,158
4 $43,304 $90,041 $670,117
5 $37,731 $95,614 $574,503
6 $31,814 $101,531 $472,972
7 $25,530 $107,815 $365,157
8 $18,858 $114,487 $250,670
9 $11,772 $121,573 $129,097
10 $4,248 $129,097 $0
$333,452 $1,000,000
In the above table, $ 1.0 billion is the debt amount.
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Introduction
m Was it "financially beneficial" for the states to
sell the toll roads in absence of budget
constraints?
a A zero-sum game? Present values (PVs and
NPVs) add up. If NPV = 0 to buyer, NPV = 0
to seller.
i Taxes make it a negative-sum game;
j Private buyer pays income taxes.
L Private buyer can't issue tax-exempt debt.
Can efficiency gains offset taxes?
2
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Valuation Approach
m Value the asset (toll road) under various scenarios:
i Zero-sum game (no taxes) = PV to Indiana or
Chicago
a After-tax to private investor
a Lost value of tax-exempt debt
a Can private operator operate more efficiently?
" Can private operator avoid political constraints on
toll increases?
3
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The value of the ITR under various scenarios
SThe theoretical value of toll road to the state of
Indiana (No taxes)
a When taxes are triggered (the state transfers asset
to the private operator)
1 When the state of Indiana finances the purchase
by tax-exempt debt
J The private operator can operate the asset (ITR)
more efficiently-
SCan levy more tolls
SOr can reduce the operating expenditures
Both the numerator (the Cash flows) and the denominator (the cost of capital)
will change in each scenario.
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Market-value of the balance sheet - Indiana
Toll Road
Assets Liabilities+ Equity
Debt (D) = 3.278 (81%)
Equity (E)= 0,770 (19%)
V=4.048 D+E=4.048
ra = rf + fl (rm
ra = 4
- rf )
.52 + 0.42 * 7.6 = 7.7%
Long-run average risk premium =7.6% at the time of transaction
Source: Macquarie financial model 2006- Analyst package
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The theoretical value of toll road to the state of
Indiana - (No taxes)
Revenues 2,325 4,159 6,680 10,735 17,244 27,713 44,514 34,840 151,483
Operating
cpenditures 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 56,929
:rating Profit 1,482 2,758 4,363 6,917 10,964 17,398 27,587 22,666 94,858
Capex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.
epreciation 34 36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
FCF 1,516 2,793 4,401 6,956 11,005 17,441 27,632 22,694 95,160
NPV @ 7.7%= $3.956 billion
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When taxes are triggered (the state transfers
asset to the private operator)
The term of concession: 75 years
nues 2,325 4,159 6,680 10,735 17,244 27,713 44,514 34,840 151,483
ating 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 56,929
nditures
ating Profit 1,482 2,758 4,363 6,917 10,964 17,398 27,587 
22,671 94,858
EX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
;s 579 1,089 1,730 2,751 4,369 6,942 11,017 9,057 36,221
eciation 34 36 38 39 4 1 43 45 28 304
936 1,705 2,670 4,205 6,636 10,499 16,615 13,641
57,338
After-tax WACC (6%)=$ 3.77 billion
APV= PV of all equity-financed+ PV of tax shields @ rd=6.78%
APV= 2.350 +1.322=$ 3.77 billion
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Monte Carlo results-Interest tax shields
3 percent 8 percent
15
percent 20 percent No debt Half Debt
PV ofFCF 3657814 3431460 3302927 2736663 2387094 2313759
PV of 207294 343639 562181 1128445 1478014 1551349
Taxes
ITR- Results of Monte Carlo Simulation - 5000 Trials
- -- PVof FCF
- - PV of Taxes
.. I-
3 percent 8 percent 15 percent 20 percent
No debt Half Debt
Variables- Volatility and magnitude ofdehbt
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* $2.410
* $1.270
* $3.68
411001.011)
2500)(1
2000K)"
1 ()04g)o
A004.00
"Increased efficiency" - Can levy more tolls
ues 2,578 4,611 7,406 11,903 19,119 30,726 49,355 38,629 164,327
ing 877 1,437 2,354 3,857 6,321 10,357 16,972 12,197 54,371ditures
ing 1,735 3,210 5,090 8,085 12,840 20,412 32,428 26,460 110,259
X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
680 1,270 2,021 3,218 5,119 8,148 12,953 10,573 43,982
,iation 34 -36 38 39 41 43 45 28 304
1,088 1,976 3,106 4,906 7,761 12,307 19,520 15,915 66,579
Increase the revenues by 11 percent; the issue of demand elasticity of tolls???
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Comparison of various scenarios- ITR
Sks"m in b m rs) ct of cpal(WACC)
vvtables *ftefmr Cast sow
Total Tta14W* Oai j JeW
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tesvako T tt toA
b t4 sbteme of Tamns rowto,,VATej 3956 77 pcet 151,43,341 6 928,578 94,eA419
'~~ktot)
Ww4 NPV -Altetta WACC 3,771 6percert 15,M.341 6,9285176 94,858419 36,2215
Cost of eqtAy . 77
"Afthe Waes me t at APV 3732 51t,483341 5632576 9458,419 37o82,,3
Cost of eqgy . 71
1N t APvwt TLCFs 3 541 perct,the costof 151,43341 5628,76 94519 37632 06
tetbt6 78 pectrt
It the Stte of hfr* ft-ncs Th cost ofdett is te
*thno 5173 t-e 4 deA woith
ettThe~vaot4e t 44percert
S AP s) (TLCF7) t* Cost o eqy -77
*eaa e e 3,956 pert, t cOst O 151,483,341 40,073,459 111,713,536 4453953
Srecedby 30 perced) de4 8pe&et
can it oen ettert g StCAsio.( ns*-,ree ste 4 52The opertltxeranses Ae
redesby 112Fse st)
8y APTL e Cot of tey -7 7
ope 0rhte eet a$ 3956 pecertWhwestot 171,176,176 5692,576 19,.7,546 45,699,00
cthe the e 6 8 permt
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147
- C 1 -- i -- I r
Market-value of the balance sheet -
Chicago Skyway
The Market- Value Balance Sheet (June, 2004) (in $billion)
Assets Liabilities + Equity
Debt (D)= 1.00(53.13%)
Equity (E)= 0.88 (46.87%)
V =1.882 D +E = 1.882
ra = rf + (rm - rf )
Ra = 4.14 percent+0.42 * 7.6 percent=7.33 percent
Long-run average risk premium =7.6 percent at the time of transaction
Source: Macquarie financial model- Analyst package
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Comparison of scenarios- Chicago Skyway
In the absence of Taxes
The value of the Chicago
Skway to the FA (the public
entity)
2,055.4 7 33%
Normal NPV -After-tax WACC 1,95. 1 609%
When the taxes are triggered, Normal APV 1,8723
Cost of equity 733%,Normal APV with TLCFs 1,912,0 cost of yt 733%,
If the City of Chicago finances The cost of debt is the
the torad via taxexemt 2,262.0 tax-exempt debt worth
debt,The value of the toll road is perct.5.33 percent.
reduced to
In the case, the vate operator y APV TLCFs (The
can be more efficient by operating exp tures areCo of y -73%,
reducing the operating reduced by 26 percent) the cost of debt--602%
expenditure
In the case, the private operator By (TLF (The prie Cost of equity- 7.33%,
can charge higher ts.o rease tols the cost of debt=6,02%
by 11 percent)
$ million
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Future Research
w Is it possible to reduce the operating expenditures
(OEX) by such percentage, given the breakdown of
the expenses?
Can the same result achieved in the case of private
ownership? Florida Turnpike case (in-house facility)
m Are there any limits to which the private operator can
raise the tolls?
n Alternative explanation- The state of Indiana or the
city of Chicago sold these assets for money.
13
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